eVote Blog

New technology will make election voting more efficient - EPSRC

2010-05-31T14:39:00.000-07:00

Newsletter posted:

Combination Ballot: A new voting system combining machine optical scanning, data processing, and manual methods is being developed by UK researchers in the hope of avoiding drawbacks with purely manual or electronic voting systems. Under development at the universities of Surrey and Birmingham, with funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, and in collaboration with the University of Luxembourg, the system uses a perforated ballot paper, randomising the order of candidates names. Voters tear the paper in half after casting their vote, scan the half with the vote on (which is fed into a database), then shred the candidates’ names. Voters then keep their casting paper, and can log on to a website to view their ballot scan, ensuring tampering cannot take place:

New technology will make election voting more efficient - EPSRC: "New technology will make election voting more efficient
26/05/2010 EPSRC press release: Did you stay up all night to hear your local result during the recent election?
Press release
26 May 2010
Time-consuming manual vote-counts and ballot boxes could soon be consigned to the history books, thanks to innovative new secure voting technology.
The system is being developed by computer scientists at the Universities of Surrey and Birmingham, with funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), and in collaboration with the University of Luxembourg.
Combining speed with total vote-counting accuracy, the system is unique because it will integrate state-of-the-art optical scanning, data processing and encryption with the tried-and-tested process of manually writing on a ballot paper."

Hong Kong Vote Was Test of Democracy - WSJ.com

2010-05-16T16:20:00.000-07:00

Hong Kong Vote Was Test of Democracy - WSJ.com: "Most Hong Kong voters skipped a citywide legislative by-election Sunday, dealing a blow to opposition lawmakers who had hoped to use the polls as a de facto referendum on the pace of democratic reforms.
About 17% of Hong Kong's 3.4 million voters cast ballots, far below the 30% turnout some opposition lawmakers had hoped to attract. The low turnout came after several weeks of subdued campaigning.
The by-election was triggered by the coordinated resignation of five opposition lawmakers who had hoped to use a voter groundswell to press government officials for faster progress on democracy—including the eventual direct election"

Kathy Dopp's latest election paper

2010-03-27T08:21:00.000-07:00

Dear colleagues (election integrity advocates),

I've publicly posted a working paper on post-election auditing
*procedures*. Your comments are welcomed. I've shared a copy with
election commissioners in the Philippines who are hoping to convince
authorities there to conduct risk-based post-election audits. Up until
now, the Philippines has employed a hand-counted voter-marked paper
ballot system that exposed ballot tampering problems to detection, and
will be using initial machine counts for the first time.

This new paper is *not* mathematical. It discusses details of
procedures necessary for conducting risk-limiting post-election audits
in order to close loopholes that could be used to tamper with
elections and detect and correct vote miscount via post-election
manual counts of voter-marked paper ballots.

It is publicly posted now at the Social Science Research Network web
site http://ssrn.com and you can search for it there by my name, Kathy
Dopp.

Checking Election Outcome Accuracy – Post-Election Auditing Procedures
Abstract:
Current voting systems and procedures used to conduct post-election
audits fail to provide reliable assurance of the accuracy of election
results. Several methods have been found that overcome some of the
obstacles to auditing caused by various election system designs. This
article provides an overview of the scope and content of post-election
auditing practices indispensable to ensuring election audits will
effectively and reliably check the accuracy of officially reported
election results.

Keywords: post-election audit, election auditing, election results accuracy

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1574536

Also, my more mathematical paper on post-election auditing sampling
methodology is posted at the Social Science Research web site:

Checking Election Outcome Accuracy, Post-Election Audit Sampling Methods
Abstract:
Methods for determining post-election audit sampling have been the
subject of extensive recent research. This article (1) provides an
overview of post-election audit sampling methods, focusing on
risk-limiting audits, (2) advances and improves three methods for
calculating risk-limiting election audit samples, showing how to apply
precise margin error bounds to improve the accuracy of existing
methods by using new margin error bounds, sampling weights and
sampling probabilities that improve the e ffectiveness of existing
approaches
for any size audit unit and for single or multi-winner election
contests, and (3) provides a new method for estimating post-election
audit sample sizes whenever detailed data, expertise, or tools are not
available.

Post-election auditing is vital to restoring public oversight over the
integrity of an electoral process that has been largely privatized
without independent checks and balances.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579182

-------------------

FYI, I am also working on three new papers:

One showing, using very simple mathematical proofs, that there is only
one simple method (not dozens of complex methods as previously
thought) for calculating 2-dimensional geographic compactness of
legislative districts and redistricting plans. After the 2010 US
census is complete, a compactness measure will be crucial for helping
redistricting commissions to avoid gerrymandering of districts for
political purposes, ensuring better proportional representation for
constituents of legislators, assuming that geographic proximity of
constituents increases shared political interests, or at the very
least makes legislative districts easier to serve for legislators and
to administer for election officials, as well as decreasing the
likelihood of gerrymandering to help specific politicians retain
control of legislatures, despite having disparate interests from a
majority of constituents.

Another paper showing how simple mathematics can be used to evaluate
precisely how electoral methods affect the ability of minority
coalitions to obtain substantive legislative representation under
conditions of various specific constituency shares that could be used
to improve the way that the Dept. of Justice operates under the
preclearance clause of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

A third paper analyzing the recent January 2010 Massachusetts
Senatorial election results, but I need to raise $200 to purchase
additional data from the Secretary of State's office to complete that
analysis, which so far shows that the presence of a computerized vote
counting machine predicts a significant rise (to the 1% level of
significance) in the Republican vote share as compared to townships
that count ballots manually.

-------------

There have been some good signs when it comes to stopping the threat
to election integrity and fairness from the instant runoff voting
method. Voters in both Burlington, VT and in Aspen, CO have rejected
IRV after trying it out and experiencing its vagaries including how
IRV eliminates the majority-favorite candidate and elects a
majority-opposed candidate (Burlington), does not allow all voters to
participate in the final counting rounds (San Francisco), and how a
candidate sometimes loses when more voters vote for him, whereas the
same candidate would win if 75 fewer voters voted for him (Aspen).
There are effective proportional voting methods that are in common use
internationally, such as the party list system that, unlike IRV, treat
all voters' votes equally and fairly, and are precinct-summable and
simple to count manually for audits.

Unfortunately election officials who think that proposed requirements
for manual counts of voter marked paper ballots go too far, and some
election integrity advocates who think that the same proposals don't
go far enough continue to work together to kill all federal election
reform that would protect us from determinative vote rigging in
upcoming state and federal legislatures and executive office
elections. Unless there can be some kind of compromise legislation,
the United States is at huge risk of being taken over irretrievably by
an element that will oppose future reform of elections to restore
public oversight over the process. You can see by reading my latest
paper on post-election auditing procedures that virtually no states
are doing everything necessary to ensure accurate election outcomes
and deter undetectable vote fraud. New Mexico and North Carolina
probably come closest, but still fall short. Valiant efforts to
achieve meaningful risk-based post-election audits state by state have
been stymied in states like New Jersey, Maryland, Florida, Tennessee
and in many other states. I may eventually try to add a
state-by-state analysis of all the loopholes in audit provisions and
statutes. About half of states make no show at auditing whatsoever,
and most of the states that do audit, leave large loopholes open to
conduct vote fraud. Massachusetts is a state that conducts no
post-election manual checks whatsoever, so is wide-open to vote
manipulation.

--

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

View my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051

Ban Touchscreen Voting - FWIW

2009-05-31T14:04:00.001-07:00

Ban Touchscreen Voting
Do you remember the Stolen Elections of 2000 (Florida) and 2004 (Ohio)? We will never forget them, because we fought hard after both elections to count every vote.
And now we can finally do something about it by passing Rep. Rush Holt's "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act."
Sign our petition to Congress:
http://democrats.com/ban-touchscreen-voting
In 2000, the Republican Supreme Court blocked a manual recount of 175,000 never-counted paper ballots and appointed George Bush as President, with disastrous consequences for our nation and the world. And in 2004, many disputed Ohio votes were cast on touchscreens, so a manual recount was impossible.
After 2004, grassroots activists across the country fought to ban touchscreen voting and to require full manual recounts in close elections. Thanks to activists, the closest race in 2008 - the Minnesota Senate battle between Al Franken and Norm Coleman - used paper ballots which were recounted entirely by hand. This careful and precise manual recount changed the result from a Coleman lead of 477 on Election night to a Franken lead of 312 today.
But a Minnesota-style recount would be impossible in one-third of the U.S. because of paperless touchscreen voting. That's why Congress must pass Rep. Rush Holt's "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act" to ban touchscreen voting and require manual recounts in close elections.
Sign our petition to Congress:
http://democrats.com/ban-touchscreen-voting

2. Cheney's Iraq-Torture Scandal

In 2002 and 2003, Dick Cheney ordered the torture of key prisoners captured in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Cheney says he ordered torture to stop another terrorist attack, but the evidence is now clear: Cheney wanted false "confessions" to justify the unprovoked U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Please sign our petition to Congress and Attorney General Holder:
http://www.democrats.com/iraq-torture-petition
Those "confessions" were featured in key pre-war speeches by Cheney, George Bush, and Colin Powell that betrayed Congress, the American people, and the world.
Thus the "Torture" scandal and the "Iraq" scandal are not two separate scandals, but one massive and historically disastrous scandal: the Iraq-Torture Scandal.
Cheney claims his torture "saved hundreds of thousands of lives." In reality, it cost hundreds of thousands of lives - innocent Iraqi lives. It also killed over 4,300 U.S. soldiers, maimed hundreds of thousands more, cost U.S. taxpayers $3 trillion dollars, and profoundly damaged U.S. credibility and security.
Dick Cheney understands the enormity of his crimes and launched a public relations war to protect himself, including carefully-chosen TV interviews and speeches. His daughter (and chief defender) Liz Cheney admitted her father's greatest fear is prosecution.
It's time for Congress to investigate the massive Iraq-Torture Scandal - and for the Department of Justice to prosecute Dick Cheney for creating it.
Please sign our petition to Congress and Attorney General Holder:
http://www.democrats.com/iraq-torture-petition

3. Break Up the Banks - Town Hall Meetings
In April, we joined A New Way Forward to hold nation-wide protests against Washington's massive bailout of the banks that created our financial crisis.
During the week of June 8, A New Way Forward will hold Town Hall Meetings to build support for breaking up the banks. If they are "too big to fail" then they are "too big to exist."
Please sign our petition to Congress:
http://www.democrats.com/break-up-the-banks
Find a Town Hall Meeting near you, or help organize one:
http://www.anewwayforward.org/demonstrations/
Thanks for all you do!
Bob Fertik
#####
Forward this message to everyone you know!
To subscribe, create a free Democrats.com account here:
http://www.democrats.com/user/register

Free & Equal Elections West Virginia Ballot Access Bill Signed into Law

2009-05-12T09:07:00.000-07:00

Bill Reduces Signature Requirements for Independent and Third Party Candidates Read More at FreeAndEqual.org

Almost a month since the West Virginia Legislature passed an improved ballot access bill, Governor Joe Manchin signed HB 2981 into law on May 8th, lowering the signature requirements to place Independent and Third Party candidates on the ballot.The new law lowers the petition signature requirement from 2% of the last vote cast, to 1%. In addition, the law moves the non-presidential petition deadline from May to August, so that it now matches the presidential petition deadline.Free & Equal applauds the West Virginia Legislator and Governor Manchin for putting aside partisan struggles and passing a law that significantly reduces the hurdles that Independent and Third Party candidates must jump through to place their names on the ballot.This law is the most significant ballot access improvement that has been enacted so far this year. Now that the law has been signed by the Governor, the only states that will have no procedure for a minor party or independent presidential candidate to get on the ballot -that is at or below 2% of the last vote cast in a midterm year- will be North Carolina and Oklahoma.OK HB 1072 is currently in a conference committee in Oklahoma, and Free & Equal will continue to monitor its progress. Free & Equal also plans to help introduce an appropriations-related ballot access bill in North Carolina for the 2010 legislative session.

Free & Equal Elections is a non partisan organization dedicated to eliminating restrictive ballot access laws that target Independent and Third-Party Candidates.Free & Equal will challenge these laws, through lobbying of state legislators, court challenges, and initiatives.

For More Information, Log on towww.FreeAndEqual.org
While you're there, why not make a donation to support ballot access reform?
Free & Equal Elections407 S. Dearborn StreetSuite 1170Chicago, IL 60605 Telephone: 312.320.4101Fax: 1.866.309.7803

Freedom to Tinker blog

2009-04-20T10:21:00.000-07:00

As usual, I don't know how many of you follow the Freedom-To-Tinker blog--so here is a fairly recent item on the status of some FLOSS concepts in the never-ending mess with e-voting:

http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/dwallach/open-source-vs-disclosed-source-voting-systems

Here is one part of the article that I think goes to the heart of the philosophy underlying FLOSS:

"Disclosing the source code only results in a complete forfeiture of the software's security if there was never any security there in the first place. If the product is well-engineered, then disclosing the software will cause no additional security problems. If the product is poorly-engineered, then the lack of disclosure only serves the purpose of delaying the inevitable."

One of the responders to the article also expresses the fundamental point rather well:

"When bad guys discover secrets, they keep quiet. They reuse the secrets or wait for a great opportunity to exploit. If most secrets are being discovered by black hats, most secrets will stay hidden from public view and will be used to compromise election after election or at least important elections. When white hats find flaws, they make noise, the result being that security bloopers get rooted out much quicker."

It seems to me that high school students (soon to be old enough to vote) and college students ought to be exposed to these ongoing techno-political debates. What would be the best ways for teachers in the fields of computer science, social studies, &c (as many areas as possible) to collaborate in the construction of relevant inter-disciplinary curricula? Of course (as is usual with high-tech topics), some of the students will be more knowledgeable than some of the teachers--but that can be a plus *IF* it is handled right.

Joel

Reply

An article that I handout to my students, presents the following scenario:

"Would you, while travelling far from home, take medicines of an unknown brand given to you by a self-proclaimed “doctor”, without documentation, and hence without (independent) assurance about the nature and proper working of the ingredients?"

The article is titled "Increased security through open source" and you can find it online here:
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0801/0801.3924v1.pdf

Though, I think that I first saw it in ACM's Communications.

My experience is that, for most students, it is a good introduction into security issues related to open source software. And with the help of a few discussion questions can spark a lively classroom discussion.

I suspect that many other teachers would find the article useful as well.

Let me know what you think,

Uno

Candidate Kick Off

2009-01-31T07:30:00.001-08:00

Great song: Vote

2009-01-28T05:55:00.000-08:00

Check out the song, Vote, by Emma's Revoluation.

We're not done. You're fired.

http://www.myspace.com/emmasrevolutionfans

From one of my adopted home towns, Christchurch, NZ

2009-01-25T18:42:00.000-08:00

With MMP having now proven the principle of proportional representation in Parliament, "where is it at local level?" we may well ask. The time is right to Have Your Say.

Christchurch City Council, to great credit, currently has its "Representation Review For the 2010 Local Authority Election" open for consultation, until Monday 9th of February 2009 - http://www.ccc.govt.nz/HaveYourSay/ConsultationView.aspx?ConsultId=573#CompleteDescription

This is a very important opportunity to express your views to the City Council, in that the results are binding for the next two local body elections in 2010 and 2013 (fixed for six whole years!) A number of electoral issues are covered by the proposal, such as ward boundaries etc, and voting system. If there are many amongst us who have read the international literature, and know Single Transferable Vote to be an even better electoral system than MMP or FPP, then now is the time to say so, clearly.

First Past the Post (FPP) is the status quo, but STV has long been established in parts of government throughout Australasia. Indeed, given that a legal challenge to Hutt City Council at the start of the current decade saw the Local Electoral Act and Local Government Act - and last year the Local Government Commission - weigh in firmly on the side of STV, we could also ask "Where is the progress?" ... That goes for every FPP council, and the confusing, mixed-system ballot paper they would seek to reproduce from 2007.

Don't let this all-influencing electoral reform issue fall through the action gap between Christmas and Waitangi, as the legislation also guides. Help create a fairer, more representative local democracy, by submitting promptly to the City Council's welcome consultation process, as best you can. They will form a response.

For some detailed relevant extracts and research links, see http://www.infohelp.co.nz/stv.html

STV's day in Christchurch is surely here. Stand up for equity - stand up for STV.

Kia ora, Rik

Richard Tindall
Cashmere, South Christchurch , O-Tautahi
Info about Rik Tindall: http://forums.e-democracy.org/p/riktindall

Voting in MN

2008-12-25T11:01:00.001-08:00

Just spoke with two in the media about this problem

2008-12-22T10:20:00.001-08:00

http://rauterkus.blogspot.com/2008/12/election-machine-firmware-verification.html

Scam Artists - Blogs - Slag Heap - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh

2008-12-19T06:33:00.000-08:00

Scam Artists - Blogs - Slag Heap - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh: "There's been some buzz lately about Pennsylvania adopting 'early voting' procedures in future elections. In other states, such procedures -- which include measures like making it easier to vote by absentee ballot -- reduced long lines in the 2008 election."

FACIL: 2008 Elections - The Free Software Pledge

2008-12-01T07:15:00.000-08:00

FACIL, a non-profit organization devoted to the promotion of Free Software, is issuing a call to all candidates regarding the use of free software in Quebec public administration.

http://facil.qc.ca/en/FreeSoftwarePledge

Would love to post the pledge, if it was in English.

The Free Software Pledge for job creation in Quebec
Submitted by Mathieu Lutfy on 12 November, 2008 - 16:05.

Montreal, November 12th 2008 - FACIL, a non-profit organization devoted to the promotion of Free Software, issues a call to all candidates regarding the use of free software in Quebec public administration.

View the list of candidates who have signed the Free Software Pledge.

The Free Software Pledge is a simple document permitting voters and other interested groups to find out which candidates and political parties in their region are aware of the issues surrounding free software, and are prepared to promote and defend the associated freedoms.

«Free software is software that can be used, studied, and modified without restriction, and which can be copied and redistributed in modified or unmodified form either without restriction, or with minimal restrictions only to ensure that further recipients can also do these things.» [1]

The opportunities for savings on IT costs are very significant; take for example the case of office software. The free software suite OpenOffice.org can adequately replace Microsoft's Office suite. When we know that the latter costs several hundred dollars per workstation and that there are more than 100 000 workstations in Quebec's various ministries and public bodies, we can see right away that the scale of potential savings is in the millions of dollars. In this period of economic crisis, it is curious that our governments are not following the lead of numerous European countries that are in the process of transitioning to OpenOffice.[2] With the knowledge that there is Free Software capable of replacing almost all software used in government today, we are actually talking about hundreds of millions of dollars in savings.

Not only that, free software creates economic activity in Quebec and it could generate much more, since such software, like all software, requires data integration, support, and training. The source code of these programs being public, it would be easy for local companies to offer the State all of these services. We could create a large number of quality local jobs. The use of free software thus permits the lowering of IT costs as well as the creation of employment.

Please find the text of the Pledge as well as the letter and documentation that has been sent to each of the candidates on the following website:

http://facil.qc.ca/en/FreeSoftwarePledge

Source : Board of FACIL
Contact : Mathieu Lutfy, president
Courriel : ca@facil.qc.ca, mathieu.lutfy@facil.qc.ca
Phone
Montreal: 514-664-1260
Quebec City: 418-907-9563

Election Frauds - Views - Potter's Field - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh

2008-11-13T03:16:00.000-08:00

Election Frauds - Views - Potter's Field - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh: "After all the talk on FOX News about voter fraud ... the pre-emptive lawsuits Republicans filed against state elections officials ... John McCain warning that the community group ACORN was 'destroying the fabric of democracy' ...
After all that, the only election-fraud allegation to make waves was leveled against -- Rick Santorum.
Yes, once again Santorum's residency was brought into question by Erin Vecchio, a local Democratic Party official who has claimed for years that Santorum really lives in Virginia, rather than the Penn Hills home Santorum claims as his address. Vecchio, who suspects Santorum may run for Governor in 2010, challenged his right to cast an absentee ballot. To tell the truth, even I'm sick of the Santorum-residency question. But what makes Vecchio's charge remarkable is it's the only one I've heard since Election Day."

Election News: Historic vote saw ups and downs at the polls - News - News - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh

2008-11-13T02:56:00.000-08:00

Election News: Historic vote saw ups and downs at the polls - News - News - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh: "Long-time voting watchdog Richard King of Squirrel Hill spent Election Day conducting exit polls at the Schenley Golf Course polling place.
'Maybe for the first time in three presidential election cycles, a president was elected legitimately,' King concluded after he and two colleagues got results heavily in favor of Barack Obama, in numbers close to the actual machine tally. 'It certainly feels like it to me.'"

DRE 700 is running strong

2008-11-09T09:26:00.001-08:00

Who should check? Owners or the builders?

2008-11-09T09:15:00.000-08:00

I hope some attorneys in PA are trying to stop this insanity of having
Diebold examine their own malfunctioning/miscounting voting machines.

From John Gideon:

PA: Northumberland County - Manufacturer to examine faulty voting machines
http://www.dailyitem.com/0100_news/local_story_313000120.html

On election day a judge ordered machines in Northumberland Co
Pennsylvania to be impounded because they were not working properly on
straight-party voting. Now a plan on investigating the problem has
been announced. The vendor, Premier/Diebold, will send technicians to
investigate the problem. In other words the county only wants to know
that they were at fault and the machines were faultless.

Where did my ballot go? Song

2008-10-26T07:55:00.001-07:00

Tune comes out of Florida, of course.

Should the USA have a Tech CTO?

2008-10-21T06:58:00.000-07:00

Humm...

System isn't kind to third parties

2008-10-16T18:03:00.000-07:00

System isn't kind to third parties: "'It's extremely difficult for third parties to get on the ballot,' Mr. Baldwin said. 'It's purposeful in my opinion.'

Bob Barr, the Libertarian candidate -- who made the Pennsylvania ballot -- feels much the same as his exiled compatriot.

'This is just another illustration of how the two major parties stack the deck against anybody daring to play on their playing field,' he said."

Vote

2008-10-03T10:24:00.001-07:00

Bailout explained by NPR

2008-10-02T10:38:00.001-07:00

This episode of NPR's This American Life did a great job explaining what
caused it all: http://thislife.org/Radio_Episode.aspx?sched=1242

Activists say voting-machine software needs a dry run before November - News - News - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh

2008-09-30T15:14:00.000-07:00

Activists say voting-machine software needs a dry run before November - News - News - Pittsburgh City Paper - Pittsburgh: "Activists say voting-machine software needs a dry run before November"

Wiki to the rescue: A Collaborative Attempt to Protect the Vote

2008-09-19T17:47:00.000-07:00

Comedian, activist, Obama supporter, and Jack & Jill Politics blogger Baratunde Thurston has launched The Voter Suppression Wiki. The freely-editable online hub aims to coordinate information and activism around any foul play and/or mess ups that might make election '08 less than on the level. Of note: Baratunde reports that the wiki is drawing on the lessons learned from the innovative Get FISA Right effort that we've often covered on techPres in the past. No matter where you stand on the subject of the wiki, you may well appreciate Get FISA's Jon Pincus's insightful analysis of how the rather vanilla technology can be used to rebalance the "information asymmetry" often at play in politics. #

Michigan Messenger - Messenger rejects GOP plea for retraction

2008-09-17T10:06:00.000-07:00

Michigan Messenger - Messenger rejects GOP plea for retraction: "The Michigan Republican Party is demanding, via press release, a retraction of the Michigan Messenger story “Lose your house, lose your vote.”

In the article, Macomb County Republican Party chairman James Carabelli was quoted as saying, “We will have a list of foreclosed homes and will make sure people aren’t voting from those addresses.”"

Should Alaska be its own nation. Vote hi-jacking

2008-09-02T01:59:00.000-07:00

Daily Kos: State of the Nation Specifically, they state three of the four following choices should be on that ballot, and that is to remain a territory - just keep your relationship the same, become a commonwealth which has all of its own advantages and disadvantages, to become a state, or to become an independent nation. When the ballot appeared before Alaskans it had statehood yes or no, and under the voters rights Act at that time, you had to be able to read and write English to vote, which pretty much took care of any of the native population having any vote in the election whatsoever.

Trib hits on democracy fronts

2008-07-18T05:36:00.001-07:00

Lance: To Dan Onorato & Allegheny County Council. They've stretched the limits of their power in pushing for a referendum to counter a voter-inspired proposal for a referendum that, if approved, would drastically cut the onerous 10 percent tax on poured alcoholic drinks.

Article XII of the county Home Rule Charter is explicit -- voter referendum is a power reserved to the people. Actually, it was designed as check on the council, if not a chief executive egging on a council dominated by the same party. "Voter" is the operative word, used no fewer than 10 times in the article's three sections.

The charter enumerates no such power for the council -- other than for the council to initiate a charter-amending referendum and for it to facilitate ballot placement of a voter-initiated referendum.

Furthermore, even if County Council had such a warrant, a ballot question asking voters to choose between the drink tax and raising property taxes -- which is the kind of question it and the ACE have been bandying about -- also is a direct violation of Article XII (Section 2). Any refe

Clearly, the proposed County Council question, and obviously supported by Mr. Onorato, deals with two (and offers quite a false choice at that).

Seizing a power government does not have, then attempting to muddy the waters with a question of dubious legality, certainly isn't what you'd call "best government practice."

If the council and the chief executive want that power, they'll have to go through the people whence they derive their permission to amend the charter. Lots of luck on that one, ladies and gentlemen.

Indeed, if the council wants to be ornery, if not suicidal, it can wait two years after the drink tax is reduced and attempt to amend or repeal the public's instructions. Which would be great economic news -- for Allegheny County's tar and feather industries.

Movie: Uncounted

2008-06-15T13:18:00.000-07:00

Everyone is asked (and reminded one more time) to please CALL YOUR STATE REP
and STATE SENATOR in their Harrisburg office tomorrow -- Monday morning and
all day Monday -- to ask them AND THEIR STAFF to be sure to attend our
screening of the acclaimed documentary film UNCOUNTED: The New Math of
American Elections. The movie is TOMORROW evening (Monday June 16) at 7 PM
in the East Wing Rotunda of the PA State Capitol Building.
http://www.votepa.us/newsarchive/2008/uncountedPACapitol1.html

We have learned that our UNCOUNTED screening is up against a big industry
event being thrown for the legislators at the PA Forum tomorrow night.
Apparently they have a "name" movie director attending to speak (and show
commercial film clips), possibly along with free food? Of course it is
always a big draw especially if there is free food, and sadly we don't have
any of that to offer -- just one truly great film and the important message
that our elections are seriously at risk and Pennsylvania needs to take
action to protect our votes. And we need our Pennsylvania officials to be
there to see and hear it.

When you call, if you are told that your Rep or Senator has other
commitments and can't come to see UNCOUNTED, remind the office in that case
to please be sure to have a staff person attend because fair and accurate
voting is an extremely important issue to your district. It would be good if
this is the person who handles election reform legislation, but ALL STAFF IS
INVITED as well as the Reps and Senators. Please get names and do your best
to get someone to make a commitment to come.

One thing to note is that the Forum event starts at 6 PM and UNCOUNTED is at
7, so it is theoretically possible for the members and staff to attend at
least some of both. But we need calls, and pressure on the Harrisburg
offices, to make that happen. You can find your Rep and Senator here:
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/find.cfm

I was lobbying and distributing invitations in the Capitol all day on
Friday. Some offices did tell me they're received some calls already about
our UNCOUNTED event, and these are ones more likely to attend. THE MORE
CALLS AN OFFICE GETS, THE MORE THEY TAKE NOTICE of both the event itself,
and of our whole issue of secure, accurate, accessible and fair elections.
This is a golden opportunity, so call, call, CALL!

One more thing as a reminder, we still need lots of support for VotePA's
share of the expenses in this event, and we are asking everyone who cares
about fair elections in Pennsylvania to kick something into the kitty to
help: http://www.votepa.us/donate.html

THANK YOU to everyone -- your assistance with this will do a lot to get the
word out in the halls of Harrisburg about the danger to our elections, and
why we need to take steps now to make voting more secure, more accurate, and
more open to all Pennsylvanians!

Marybeth

____________
Marybeth Kuznik, Executive Director
VotePA
Statewide Alliance for Voting Rights and Election Integrity
http://www.votePA.us

Free screening of "Uncounted" at capitol on June 16

Please join us for a special screening of the documentary film

Uncounted

Monday, June 16th, 2008

7:00 p.m.

East Wing Rotunda of the Capitol Building

Harrisburg

No Admission Fee - Public Welcome

To view a movie trailer go to <http://www.uncountedthemovie.com/>
www.UncountedTheMovie.com

Uncounted, by Emmy award winning director David Earnhardt is an explosive
new documentary showing how the election fraud that changed the outcome of
2004 election led to greater fraud in 2006. With 51 of Pennsylvania's 67
counties using paperless electronic voting machines it is at particular risk
in 2008. This controversial 80 minute film examines in factual, logical
and yet startling terms how easy it is to change election outcomes and
undermine election integrity across the U.S. Beyond increasing public
awareness about how votes are counted in America, Uncounted inspires greater
citizen involvement in fixing a broken electoral system.

There will be a Q&A session after the film, featuring Marybeth Kuznik who
appears in the film. (Sponsored by the Common Cause Education Fund, VotePA,
and the PA League of Women Voters.)

For information call 717-232-9951

Help:Polls - Wikia Help

2008-05-23T11:12:00.000-07:00

Help:Polls - Wikia Help: "Help:Polls
From Wikia Help

This extension is enabled by default on Wikia.

Extreme Democracy

2008-05-09T06:13:00.000-07:00

Extreme Democracy: "The Book and Discussion Forum for Networked Activists"

Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman | Did the US Supreme Court Just Elect John McCain?

2008-04-30T20:34:00.000-07:00

Bob Fitrakis & Harvey Wasserman | Did the US Supreme Court Just Elect John McCain?: "By 6-3 the Court has upheld an Indiana law that requires citizens to present a photo identification card in order to vote. Florida, Michigan, Louisiana, Georgia, Hawaii and South Dakota have similar laws. Though it's unlikely, as many as two dozen other states could add them by election day. Other states, like Ohio, have less stringent ID requirements than Indiana's, but still have certain restrictions that are strongly opposed by voter rights advocates."

techPresident – Twittering Philly

2008-04-29T10:50:00.000-07:00

techPresident – Twittering Philly: "Twittering Philly
By Patrick Ruffini, 04/22/2008 - 9:46am

The use of Twitter as a discovery vehicle for raw political intelligence takes another step today with Election Journal, a project by Republican election watchdog Mike Roman. The site is using Twitter, Flickr, and Google Maps to cover primary election day in Philadelphia, with Twittering correspondents stationed around the city.

Anyone who's worked a few election days in Philly knows how colorful things can get. Violence, intimidation, broken machines, and officials denied entry into polling places are par for the course. With more than 1,600 precincts in the city alone, it's difficult to get a handle on it all. Here's hoping a little technology-enabled citizen journalism can bring some much needed transparency to election day.

Follow @ElectionJournal on Twitter to get live breaking updates. And here's a map of the incidents they've uncovered so far:"

Personal Democracy Forum 2008 - New York - United States

2008-04-29T10:36:00.000-07:00

Personal Democracy Forum 2008 - New York - United States: "Personal Democracy Forum 2008, June 23-24, NYC
Theme: Rebooting the System - Register Now

Technology and the Internet are changing politics -- now more than ever. Over the last five years, Personal Democracy Forum (PdF) has become the seminal gathering place for the growing community of people who understand the effects underway, and want to make sure they stay on top of what’s coming next.

This year PdF will be bigger and better than before--we're expanding to two full days at a spectacular new venue overlooking Central Park, at Rose Hall, the home of Jazz at Lincoln Center."

The 2008 election has shown that the Internet has become the central battlefield for campaigns, from the presidential race on down. So, on the first day of PdF 2008, we're going to focus on how technology is changing the electoral process. But we all know that no matter who is elected, big changes are also coming in how government uses technology to serve or connect with the public. That's why we're adding a whole second day to the PdF agenda, devoted to how technology is changing governance and civic action.

Who’s coming? Leaders from the world of technology, politics, journalism, blogging, and activism. Stay tuned for details.

Topics we'll be covering:

The top political technology applications of 2008
Open fundraising and how to create internet “money bombs”
Mastering the new videosphere of YouTube, MySpace and Yahoo Video
Engaging and mobilizing young voters online
Bloggers as pundits, pundits as bloggers
Converting online supporters into on-the-ground volunteers
Polling and its discontents
The inside scoop on what worked and what didn't from the Presidential campaigns
The coming of "Wiki Government"
Hyperpeople and hyperpolitics
Creating better debates with and without television
The cross-partisan politics of transparency
The changing role of the net-roots and the right-roots
Embracing voter-generated content
The internet's revolutionary power overseas
Creating national tech policies
Social technology and how the internet can save the planet
The rise of dynamic data-driven journalism

Check out this short highlight video from last year’s conference for a sample of what to expect.

Closed caption and Spanish version

If you register now, you’ll save $100 off the full ticket price. That’s two days of Personal Democracy Forum for only $595, including access to all the sessions, breakfast, lunch, an open-bar cocktail reception and unlimited networking.

Where and When

Location:	Rose Hall, Jazz at Lincoln Center Broadway at 60th Street New York, New York 10023 United States
Map:	Google \| Yahoo \| Mapquest
Date:	Jun 23-24, 2008

Conference Tag: pdf2008

Online polling likely to grow in accuracy, influence | ScrippsNews

2008-03-29T19:06:00.000-07:00

Online polling likely to grow in accuracy, influence | ScrippsNews PITTSBURGH -- Your home phone rings, but you don't pick up because you don't recognize the number that flashes on your caller ID. Or maybe you abandoned your landline months ago because it's more economical to use your cell phone.

You're precisely the type of person John Dick is betting on: someone who won't bother with traditional telephone polls but is likely to respond to political or consumer questions while browsing the Internet.

- U.S. Olympic Hall Of Fame -

2008-03-25T19:09:00.000-07:00

- U.S. Olympic Hall Of Fame -: "Vote now for the U.S. Olympic Hall of Fame Class of 2008."

Ohio voting machines declared an official crime scene - The INQUIRER

2008-03-19T06:29:00.000-07:00

Ohio voting machines declared an official crime scene - The INQUIRER: "Ohio voting machines declared an official crime scene"

Texas sized problem -- Hillary's win was called too soon

2008-03-06T08:52:00.000-08:00

Consortiumnews.com: "Editor’s Note: Hillary Clinton prevailed in the Texas primary, beating Barack Obama by a 51-to-48 margin and claiming 65 delegates to his 61. However, Texas has a two-step process for apportioning its delegates, meaning that Obama had a chance to reverse Clinton’s four-delegate net gain in the caucus phase.

Historian Lisa Pease examines how this curious twist in the march to the Democratic presidential nomination is turning out:

Tuesday night, as the polls closed, the media proclaimed Barack Obama the winner of Vermont and gave all the other state contests of the day -- Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas -- to Hillary Clinton.
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But there was one big problem. A Texas-sized problem.

The election results from the Lone Star State’s caucuses had only just started coming in."

NH Vote Recount Report by WTP

2008-02-23T17:18:00.000-08:00

Optical Scan Machines Violate Federal Law

With an interest in defending the individual's constitutionally guaranteed Right to have and to know that his vote is being accurately counted, this Foundation determined the 2008 New Hampshire Primary recount offered an excellent, real-world opportunity to independently assess the statistical performance of optical scan, electronic vote counting machines relative to hand counting of ballots.

WTP has just completed its analysis of the data. Our principal findings are as follows.

Of the 347, 905 total ballots processed during the recount 305,207 (87.7%) came from towns and cities that use machines to count the votes, and 42,619 (12.3%) came from towns that use People to count the votes.

New Hampshire's vote counting machines violate federal accuracy standards. New Hampshire's machines experienced an error rate approximately 163 times greater than the error rate allowed under federal Election Law.

The probability that an individual's vote was accurately counted during the Primary was much greater if his vote was counted by hand than by machine.

Statewide, taking into consideration all the ballots that were included in the recount, the number of machine counts that were in error by more than 2 votes was 9.81 times greater than the number of hand counts that were off by more than 2 votes. The number of machine counts that were in error by more than 1 vote was 3.37 times greater than the number of hand counts that were off by more than 1 vote.

We identified 38 instances of apparent fraud where votes were being hand counted.

We were not able to determine if intentional or unintentional error was behind the more substantial discrepancies in machine counts. Nor were we able to determine the impact of the 21 machines that failed on Primary Day, or if other machine failures occurred but were not reported to the Secretary of State's office.

In brief, the analysis data supports the conclusion that not only are machine counts of votes much more likely to result in error, but the machine errors are of a significantly larger magnitude and variance than those observed for hand counting.

When the much higher frequency of machine-counted errors is coupled with the statistically disturbing magnitude of the machine errors, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the use of optical scan machines to count votes has robbed many citizens of New Hampshire of their Right to Vote and their Right to have their Vote counted accurately.

Our analysis of the state's data and election practices suggest that there are numerous steps that the government of New Hampshire can take to bolster the integrity of its election process - whether votes are counted by hand or by machine. Although hand-counting of votes is clearly not yet a perfected art, in keeping alive the practice of hand-counting, New Hampshire has served its citizens well. Beyond this, the state should not subject its People to further enduring electronic voting machines that grossly fail to meet even the minimal accuracy standards mandated by federal law.

We hope our analysis has provided some much needed light onto a matter that substantially affects the future of freedom in New Hampshire - and our entire Republic.

Click Here To Access the Full WTP NH Recount Report
& the supporting analysis

Under counting of votes in NY State from another blog

2008-02-16T18:25:00.000-08:00

The Burgh Report 2008 Obama Undercounts in the New York Primary

Team 4 Investigates Voting Machine Security Issues - Pittsburgh News Story - WTAE Pittsburgh

2008-02-08T06:13:00.000-08:00

Team 4 Investigates Voting Machine Security Issues - Pittsburgh News Story - WTAE Pittsburgh The way things are shaping up, Pennsylvania's presidential primary could be a deciding contest. But before you go to the polls, there's something you should know about the personal safety and security of your vote.

Range Voting

2008-02-07T07:12:00.000-08:00

Some in possession of big mathematics insights have insist that range voting is fundamentally better than ranked voting. If you're interested, see http://rangevoting.org.

Range Voting is the best of any known voting system, where "best" means that it produces the greatest overall happiness/satisfaction. This holds true even if people try to game the system by doing things like ranking their top choice as 100% and all other choices 0%. (In fact, it's rational to do this if you know that your top choice is polling just barely behind your #2 choice.)

Progress in MN in a neighborhood email list kick-off

2008-02-06T09:02:00.000-08:00

Last night was a thrill in Minnesota. It was caucus night as part of the "Super Tuesday" in our presidential selection process.

Like many of you, I am about to volunteer to host a local forum - in this case E-Democracy's second neighborhood forum in Minneapolis (in the area where I live - http://e-democracy.org/se ). Walking the talk.

While I've recruited a bit online and last weekend the neighborhood association included a plug in their print newsletter sent to the few thousand households in the neighborhood, registrations sat at 25 people. Last night I signed up 116 more members so we can now open to posting.

Last year, the Canterbury, New Zealand launch reminded us of the importance of promoting paper sign-ups at the right public events to recruit people. What might you do in your community to bring in new members?

Here are updated sign-up forms/templates you can all use in your in-person recruitment efforts:

* US PDF: http://e-democracy.org/if/issuesforumsignupform.pdf

* US Word: http://e-democracy.org/if/issuesforumsignupform.doc (if you want to change text)

* UK/NZ A4 Word: http://e-democracy.org/if/issuesforumsignupformuknz.doc (you can adapt text)

More details: http://blog.e-democracy.org/posts/138

The upload process is pretty easy - all you need to do is type up the results in a spreadsheet with columns for "first name," "last name," and "e-mail" and send them to us: team@e-democracy.org

I'll report back on how the Standish Ericcson Neighbors Forum opening goes. One caution is that in-person recruitment may be too effective and bring in people who don't want a lot of e-mail or are not quite sure what they signed up to receive.

My plan:

1. Type the results into a spreadsheet to prepare for uploading to GroupServer.

2. Send a Bcc: e-mail to everyone confirming that they are about to be added to the online group. Letting them know that they can easily change their settings to digest or unsubscribe and add a few lines to get them excited about what is next.

3. Add the new e-mail addresses while the group is still closed to public posting.

4. Send a "Want only one e-mail a day? Digest option" note. Setting digest is super easy via e-mail.

5. Send a "How to change your password to something you'll remember" post

6. Send a "We about to open, but first let's each invite someone on our block to join"

7. Ask keepers of area e-mail announcement lists (police departments community policing list, neighborhood association, local city council member) to pass on the invite and provide announcements to the forum when appropriate. I think it is easier to get e-officials on a forum before you launch.

8. Send a reminder about digest mode with a sample digest and introduce the web-based no e-mail option as an alternative (I want to keep as many people on digest as possible). By keeping the group on moderation initially you can stop the lemming effect of one person saying (if often not so nice a way) take me off this darn thing leading to a series of me-too replies. It may only be five to ten people, but wayward unsubscribe efforts sent to group by mistake creates a false impression of a negative movement.

9. Keep group on temporary moderation for the "Introductions" phase to manage _voluntary_ introductions over a week or two. I strongly recommend a series of introductions both when opening forums and re-introductions every year or so. This humanizes the forum and builds trust and accountability to real, known people. You'll find roughly twice the number of people are willing to say hello than post their opinions on a regular basis. People who post introductions have now broken the ice and are more likely to post again. The first call will generate 10-15 or so introductions, but don't stop there - thank those how found it easy to say hello and you'll prompt another 10 or more people to say hello.

10. Make the "Introductions" topic "Sticky" via the web so it is listed a top the web view to help new and prospective members get a sense of who's who.

11. Open to the forum to a fully unmoderated mode for general discussion and exchange of announcements.

12. Tune in particularly closely to early rule violations - off topic posts, uncivil behavior, etc. - and act decisively early to put the whole group on notice that the forum charter and rules will be enforced. This will actually improve self-policing and reduce the management required over the long-term.

13. Keep the setting, "moderate new members" in place to avoid fly by night posters, but actively set them to unmoderate with their first legitimate post.

14. Down the road, introduce the opportunity for participants to upload a photo to there member profile page which will stick their picture next to there posts on the web view.

Cheers,
Steven Clift
Chair, E-Democracy.Org

Steven Clift
Ericsson, Hennepin
Info about Steven Clift: http://forums.e-democracy.org/contacts/stevenclift

This topic's messages may be viewed at: http://forums.e-democracy.org/r/topic/2rcxB7h01P342hRKBVeEeP

Third Party Watch � Blog Archive � Historic Primary Election in Arizona

2008-02-06T08:42:00.000-08:00

Third Party Watch � Blog Archive � Historic Primary Election in Arizona: "The Arizona Libertarian Party is one of three fully ballot qualified political parties in the state and therefore legally entitled to participate in the presidential preference primary election proceedings on Super Tuesday. Unlike the Democratic and Republican parties, Arizona Libertarians aren’t conducting their election process in the traditional polling booths or at taxpayer expense.

“This is believed to be the first time in U.S. history that a state-wide election has been held via the Internet, only,” stated party chairman Michael Kielsky in a press release."

Dave says let's not play that game. Harold like the instant run-off voting component, as an aside

2008-02-06T08:39:00.000-08:00

Apparently the Arizona LP has succumbed to a computer virus... namely, Internet voting: http://thirdpartywatch.com/2008/02/02/historic-primary-election-in-arizona/

Hopefully we can agree not to do that in PA?

States Prepare for Tests of Voting System Changes

2008-02-05T07:48:00.000-08:00

States Prepare for Tests of Voting System Changes: "After California ordered a switch to paper ballots from touch-screen voting machines for Tuesday's primary, election officials in the sprawling, 7,200-square-mile Riverside County had to decide the best way to pick up the ballots so they could be centrally counted on time: helicopter or truck?

They chose land rather than air, because the last time the helicopter had been grounded by fog. But then they encountered another problem: 60,000 absentee ballots had begun to fall apart at the fold lines.

'They may be high-tech or they could be low-tech, but the problems are always there,' said Barbara Dunmore, the county registrar of voters."

An exhaustive, year-long study of Florida's undervotes in the 2006 general election is now available

2008-01-25T18:12:00.000-08:00

Sarasota's Vanished Votes - An Investigation into the Cause of Uncounted Votes in the 2006 Congressional District 13 Race in Sarasota County, Florida
http://www.floridafairelections.org/reports/Vanishing_Votes.pdf

Florida Fair Election Center researchers spent a full year conducting an examination of public records in Florida. The iVotronic voting system failed to count over 100,000 votes in various races across the state of Florida in the November 2006 election.

The Florida Fair Election Center study completely refutes the theories that substantial numbers of voters intentionally withheld their votes in the CD-13 race or that so-called "poor ballot design" was responsible for the uncounted votes. By process of elimination, the only possible cause of the high undervotes is the catastrophic failure of the iVotronic voting system, and this report details the ways in which this catastrophic failure occurred.

The study found a badly designed, shoddily-built, poorly maintained, aging voting system in a state of critical breakdown.

The examination of records from Florida ES&S iVotronic counties proves that machine malfunctions and software problems caused the Sarasota undervotes.

The study found serious procedural and substantive flaws in the audit conducted and commissioned by the Florida Department (FLDoS), which omitted essential areas of investigation that would have provided evidence that large-scale machine malfunction contributed to the unusually large undervote and noted that the three entities that claimed the voting system had functioned correctly—the Florida Secretary of State, the Sarasota Supervisor of Elections, and ES&S—were defendants in two lawsuits seeking to overturn the results of the CD-13 race. The Florida Secretary of State, through the Division of Elections, was responsible for having certified this faulty voting system to begin with. The Sarasota Supervisor of Elections had defended the iVotronic system since its inception and continued to do so following the election—in many ways she had tied her reputation to the purported reliability of the iVotronic machines. ES&S, as the supplier, had nothing to gain and everything to lose by admitting that its voting system had failed, not only in Sarasota but across the entire state of Florida.

Read the full study here:
http://www.floridafairelections.org/reports/Vanishing_Votes.pdf

voting: Map according to various machines in use

2008-01-22T11:03:00.000-08:00

voting: Map: "Voting in Your County

Select the county you will be voting in by using the map or the list of County links below. This will give you information on what voting system your county is using."

Live WTP New Hampshire Recount Video Coverage

2008-01-22T07:18:00.000-08:00

http://forum.w4sp.com/

http://www.wethepeople.com

As we previously announced, following the discovery of large statistical anomalies indicating possible evidence of voter machine fraud, WTP is headed to New Hampshire to help witness the recount of its primary ballots.

Live Interactive Video Conferencing from NH

To broadcast its recount coverage, WTP is making available a state-of-the-art Internet video conferencing system so that our supporters can be kept abreast of the developments as they unfold live.

Witnesses to the very first parts of the recount have already reported broken ballot-box seals and recounts exposing significant discrepancies between the reported machine totals and the recount totals.

We urge everyone to help stand watch over the recount by subscribing to WTP's video Recount Forum.

Forum participants will be able to have unlimited, LIVE video/interactive access to the WTP Recount Forum for a donation of only $15.

REMEMBER - you must manually register (STEP #2) to obtain your password after donating to the Congress.

Click here to DONATE & REGISTER to join the forum: http://forum.w4sp.com/

IF YOU HAVE ALREADY DONATED but failed to register to obtain your password on STEP #2, Please click on the link above and do so ASAP!

Even if you have little interest in joining the live interactive NH video conferences, please help support our efforts by making a separate donation today.

Many thanks in advance for your generous support.

South Carolina primary plagued by bad voting machines, snow - CNN.com

2008-01-19T17:11:00.000-08:00

South Carolina primary plagued by bad voting machines, snow - CNN.com: "Malfunctioning voting machines plagued Horry County, which contains the cities of Myrtle Beach and North Myrtle Beach. 'Human error' put the machines offline in 80 percent of the county's precincts during Saturday's voting, according to county spokeswoman Lisa Bourcier

By 4 p.m. ET, only about four of the county's 118 precincts were without a working machine, Bourcier said. Polls closed at 7 p.m. ET.

One person, one vote -- except for those in the legislature

2008-01-18T17:35:00.000-08:00

The Ballot dot Org

2008-01-18T13:24:00.000-08:00

Remember how good it felt to waltz into the polls with your very own voter guide in hand? :)

A lot of other people felt it too. Back in 2006, over just two days, over 20,000 people came to theballot.org! And those people used your guides, printed them out, and forwarded them to friends. We heard tons of great feedback about them.

It's only gonna get crazier in 2008, and the primary elections are upon us! Can we count on you to make a guide again this year? Let me know. Sometimes newbies are hesitant to post guides until they see others on there, so we're hoping you voter guide veterans will get us started this weekend.

Hop onto http://theballot.org to get started. As usual, feel free to hit me up with questions or whatever.

-Sam D.

Triblocal - St. Charles Story / Local athlete needs your votes

2008-01-17T14:05:00.000-08:00

Triblocal - St. Charles Story / Local athlete needs your votes: "Local athlete needs your votes
Triblocal 01/15/08 09:19 AM 127 hits

Voting will continue through Jan. 25 for the January Sports Person of the Month."

BACKGROUND: NEW HAMPSHIRE'S UNAUDITED DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

2008-01-17T13:46:00.000-08:00

The analysis of the National Election Data Archive
http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/DemPrimary2008-PairedPrecinctStudy.pdf

"The Diebold Effect": Hillary's Votes Higher From Diebold Machines
Even Controlling for Demographics (education, income, population, etc)
http://scienceblogs.com/developingintelligence/2008/01/the_diebold_effect_hillarys_vo.php

NEW HAMPSHIRE RECOUNT SO FAR - FINDS ERRORS IN INSUFFICIENT AMOUNTS TO
REVERSE THE OUTCOME

NH Recount Finds Vote Count Errors, by Steven Rosenfeld, AlterNet.
January 17, 2008.

So far the errors highlight problems with electronic voting, but don't overturn Clinton's surprise victory.
http://www.alternet.org/democracy/74102/

To see the discrepancies between machine and hand counts - the NH SOS recount page:
http://www.sos.nh.gov/recountresults.htm

RECOUNT OF THE 2008 NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY ELECTION

Kucinich has decided to ask for a partial hand recount of New Hampshire's machine counts. My analysis shows that to confirm New Hampshire's close margin (less than 3% difference between Obama and Clinton) Democratic primary election results, a partial hand count would need to randomly select and hand count from 34% to 45% of New Hampshire's precincts - from 61 to 178 precincts - to give 95% confidence-level in the New Hampshire outcomes, depending on initial assumptions. The reason that this New Hampshire race requires such a large audit is due to the small race margin and the extreme variation in precinct sizes in New Hampshire - from 5,542 votes to 1 vote cast in each precinct. See the worksheet "95%Confidence-Level-Amt" in
http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/Primary2008/NH2008Primary.xls

U.S. Representative Kucinich asks for a Recount of NH machine counts in the interest of election integrity
http://www.dennis4president.com/go/homepage-items/kucinich-asks-for-new-hampshire-recount-in-the-interest-of-election-integrity/

Kucinich is asking for donations to pay for the Democratic Primary recount
http://www.usalone.com/kucinich_constitution.php

A place to donate for the Republican Primary recount (Albert Howard) Nearly $60,000 isbeing charged to Howard who is a Black-American limousine driver and father of eight from Ann Arbor.
http://grannywarrior.chipin.com/recount

Recount cost could climb to $125,000 - New hand tally would start tomorrow
http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080115/FRONTPAGE/801150398

QUESTIONS THE PRESS COULD ASK DURING EACH ELECTION ARE:

Does this state conduct any publicly observable post-election independent manual counts to check the accuracy of machine counts? (This would require voter-created, or at least voter-checked, paper ballots.)

Were the detailed vote count data and raw polling data made publicly available immediately after the election for analysts to detect any possible suspicious patterns?

Were the invisibly-machine-counted vote counts checked? Are the machine counts provably correct?

Is there public oversight over chain of custody procedures for election records and ballots?

What are the state's procedures for securing paper ballot and election records; and how may the public participate?

DATA AVAILABLE FOR ANALYZING THE NEW HAMPSHIRE JANUARY 8, 2008 PRIMARY
ELECTION RESULTS

National Election Data Archive
http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/2008Primary/

SOME NEW ARTICLES ON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTION

Guest Editorial: Live Free or Diebold
by Julian Davis‚ Jan. 14‚ 2008
http://www.beyondchron.org/articles/Guest_Editorial_Live_Free_or_Diebold_5264.html

Recounts good test of voting integrity, Editorial in Nashua Telegraph
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080114/OPINION01/609682470/-1/opinion

Silvestro the cat [who programs NH voting machines]/ NH voting
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiiaBqwqkXs

New Hampshire Exit Poll, LA Times, January 14, 2008
http://www.latimes.com/la-exitpoll-nh-graphic,0,7161708.htmlstory?coll=la-home-center

Chris Matthews Reported Mid-day polls put Obama ahead
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Jo4pwCG23c

New Hampshire Recount Information
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/5344

Ron Paul's campaign is finding suspicious discrepancies in the counts
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qV6qAGigGYY&eurl=http://progressiveindependent.com/dc/dcboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=120&topic_id=3779

Candidates say they can pay for recounts
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080115/NEWS08/383047012/-1/news

Kucinich Asks for New Hampshire Recount in the Interest of Election Integrity
By Dennis Kucinich Media Release January 10, 2008
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2711&Itemid=94

Let recount show N.H. gets its vote tallies right, Jan. 17
http://www.seacoastonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080117/OPINION/801170392/-1/NEWS19

Correction re: NH recount, HOW DOES NEW HAMPSHIRE'S RECOUNT CULTURE
FACILITATE RATHER THAN DETER ELECTION RIGGING? by Mark Crispin Miller
http://markcrispinmiller.blogspot.com/2008/01/correction-re-nh-recount.html

FYI: MOVING ON TO MARYLAND (WHICH, LIKE SOUTH CAROLINA, USES PAPERLESS
E-BALLOTS)

Company Connected to GOP and Romney Delivers Diebold Machines to Maryland Polls by Kim Zetter Email January 17, 2008
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/company-connect.html

PLEASE DONATE

US Count Votes, DBA National Election Data Archive urgently needs your donations if it is to continue its work to try to obtain public oversight over the integrity of election results via mandatory routine vote count audits and public access to election records and election data, and public oversight over ballot security procedures. Donating money to get out the vote efforts, to political candidates, or to efforts to educate voters on issues, makes little difference if votes
are not accurately counted. NEDA can not continue its efforts without funding.

http://electionarchive.org/fairelection/donate.html

THANK YOU. PLEASE PASS ON THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.

CONTACT: Kathy Dopp kathy@electionarchive.org 435-658-4657

--

Kathy Dopp, Executive Director, The National Election Data Archive

P.O. Box 682556
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

Watch via Technorati

2008-01-15T15:31:00.001-08:00

Yep, it is mine.

RELEASE: NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY – WERE VOTES COUNTED ACCURATELY?

2008-01-14T04:12:00.000-08:00

http://electionarchive.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=149&Itemid=84

Park City, UT January 14, 2008

CONTACT: Kathy Dopp kathy@electionarchive.org 435-658-4657

NEW HAMPSHIRE'S DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTION RESULTS ARE SUSPICIOUS

Pre-election polls projected that Barrack Obama would win the New
Hampshire Democratic primary election. An average of seven opinion
polls predicted that 38.8 percent were going to vote for Obama, while
30 percent would vote for Clinton. The opinion polls came close to
predicting the final results for New Hampshire's hand-counted votes -
39.2% for Obama and 34.9% for Clinton - but New Hampshire's
Diebold/Premier machine-counted votes reversed the outcome.

The reversal of the machine and hand counts is consistent with
programming errors counting votes cast for Obama, for Clinton and
votes cast for Clinton, for Obama.

To see this consistency of New Hampshire's election results with
programming error, analysts examined Clinton and Obama vote shares out
of votes cast only for Obama and Clinton. Overall, Clinton's hand
count share of such votes is 47.07% to Obama's 52.93% share and a
virtually exact reverse pattern occurs with machine counts where
Clinton's share is 52.95% to Obama's 47.05%.

A statistical analysis of New Hampshire's Democratic primary by the
National Election Data Archive rules out precinct-size and seems to
rule out demographic factors as possible causes for the reversal of
Obama and Clinton's machine and hand-counted results; and shows that
the pattern is consistent with vote miscount favoring Clinton.

The National Election Data Archive's New Hampshire analysis and raw
data is posted on the Internet at ElectionArchive.org

http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/DemPrimary2008-PairedPrecinctStudy.pdf
and
http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/

About 80% of New Hampshire ballots were counted by Diebold/Premier
optical scanning machines without any post-election manual audits to
verify the machine count accuracy.

Press reports hypothesized theories for why Clinton beat Obama in New
Hampshire including:

1. the "Bradley effect" (closet racism) that white voters lie to
pollsters and "say" they'll vote for a Black, but given a secret
ballot don't,

2. the "damsel in distress" theory that Clinton's tears brought women
voters out for her,

3. the "good weather" theory, and

4. the "economy was key" theory.

It would be interesting to know why these effects would only occur
when ballots are counted by Diebold/Premier voting machines but not
when ballots are counted in public view by hand.

The "electronic miscount" theory could be a more plausible explanation
for the discrepancies between the opinion polls and the
machine-counted results.

Could someone have mis-programmed – by accident or on purpose – the
optical scan machines such that Hillary's votes went to Obama and
Obama's votes went to Hillary?

UPCOMING RECOUNT OF THE TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 2008 NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY ELECTION

The Secretary of State (SOS) of New Hampshire announced that there
will be a statewide recount of the paper ballots beginning on
Wednesday, January 16, because presidential candidates Democrat Dennis
Kucinich and Republican Albert Howard requested it.
http://www.sos.nh.gov/recount%20press%20release.pdf

It is imperative that, not only ballots, but poll books and absentee
and provisional voter records are inspected for a representative
sample of recounted precincts. Post 2004 election investigations of
"recounted" (and non-recounted) precincts in Ohio discovered large
numbers of "phantom" ballots for which no voting records could be
found, and disenfranchised voters for whom no ballot could be found -
see http://baiman.blogspot.com/

U.S. Representative Kucinich asks for a Recount of NH machine counts
in the interest of election integrity
http://www.dennis4president.com/go/homepage-items/kucinich-asks-for-new-hampshire-recount-in-the-interest-of-election-integrity/

Kucinich is asking for donations to pay for the Democratic Primary recount
http://www.dennis4president.com/go/homepage-items/help-defend-the-integrity-of-our-voting-system/

CONCLUSION:

Is the suspicious pattern in New Hampshire's Democratic primary
results caused by voting machine counting? We have no clear idea,
because we have no confidence in the unaudited machine vote counting
process. Knowing how easy it is to corrupt machine-counted election
results, it is appalling that New Hampshire and other states do not
routinely conduct post-election manual checks of the accuracy of
machine vote counts. Human mistakes and worse are inevitable, and
without routine post-election measures to detect and correct mistakes,
and without public oversight over security and chain of custody of
ballots, inaccurate vote counts and incorrect election results are
inevitable.

The full analysis of the National Election Data Archive is available
at ElectionArchive.org
http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/DemPrimary2008-PairedPrecinctStudy.pdf

QUESTIONS THE PRESS COULD ASK DURING EACH ELECTION ARE:

Does this state conduct any publicly observable post-election
independent manual counts to check the accuracy of machine counts?
(This would require voter-created, or at least voter-checked, paper
ballots.)

Were the detailed vote count data and raw polling data made publicly
available immediately after the election for analysts to detect any
possible suspicious patterns?

Were the invisibly-machine-counted vote counts checked, audited,
provably correct?

Is there public oversight over chain of custody procedures for
election records and ballots?

What are the state's procedures for securing paper ballot and election
records; and how may the public participate?

DATA AVAILABLE FOR ANALYZING THE NEW HAMPSHIRE JANUARY 8, 2008 PRIMARY
ELECTION RESULTS

Another Statistical analysis which reaches the same conclusions as the
National Election Data Archive, with links to vote count data
http://call-with-current-continuation.blogspot.com/2008/01/statistical-exploration-of-new.html

New Hampshire Secretary of State Web Site
http://www.sos.nh.gov/presprim2008/index.htm

2008 New Hampshire Republican & Democratic Primary Results
http://ronrox.com/paulstats.php?party=REPUBLICANS
http://ronrox.com/paulstats.php?party=DEMOCRATS

The type of voting method each town uses:
http://www.bbvdocs.org/NH/state/Jan-08-votingsystems-NH.txt
http://www.sos.nh.gov/voting%20machines2006.htm

National Election Data Archive
http://electionarchive.org/ucvData/NH/

Pre-election opinion polls:
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/nh/new_hampshire_democratic_primary-194.html

Note: No exit poll data was publicly released after the election
unless it had been adjusted to match the final unofficial vote counts.
I.e. No public exit poll data is available to use to judge the
accuracy of the election results as occurred after the 2004
presidential election.

CNN Exit poll info:
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/epolls/index.html#val=NHDEM

FOX News Exit Polls: Women and Seniors Like Clinton
http://youdecide08.foxnews.com/2008/01/08/fox-news-exit-polls-independents-like-obama-mccain/

SOME OTHER ARTICLES ON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTION

NY Times on the planned NH recount on
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/11/candidates-push-for-a-nh-recount/

Keith Olberman Covers the Story
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMJB4OCE1fo

Diebold Again: Did Hillary Really Win New Hampshire?
by Dave Lindorff
http://baltimorechronicle.com/2008/011108Lindorff.shtml

New Hampshire to Recount Ballots in Light of Controversy
by Kim Zetter January 11, 2008
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/new-hampshire-t.html

Do NH Primary Statistics Show Election Fraud?
http://salonesoterica.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/do-nh-primary-statistics-show-election-fraud/

Informative article w/ good links to exit poll info
http://www.margieburns.com/blog/_archives/2008/1/9/3455407.html

Diebold favors Hillary, hand count for Obama
http://presscue.com/node/38034

Election Integrity Questioned in New Hampshire - Dennis Kucinich
formally requests recount
By Michelle Wolski, Epoch Times Florida Staff
http://en.epochtimes.com/news/8-1-11/63935.html

Electronic voting machine results questioned in New Hampshire primary
Dan Kaplan
http://www.scmagazineus.com/Electronic-voting-machine-results-questioned-in-New-Hampshire-primary/article/104145/

Alternet: http://www.alternet.org/story/73551/

Primary Concerns - Hoisting a few red flags about the elections
by Robert C. Koehler, Tribune Media Services, January 10, 2008
http://www.commonwonders.com/archives/col429.htm

Ben Mosley's Blog
http://benmoseley.blogspot.com/2008/01/do-nh-primary-statistics-show-election.html

Analysis of Hand-counted versus Diebold-counted Precincts
http://i4.tinypic.com/823g1mt.gif

http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/rahmainepugh/CWg

Where Paper Prevailed, Different Results, By Lori Price
http://www.legitgov.org/nh_machine_vs_paper.html

PLEASE DONATE

US Count Votes, DBA National Election Data Archive urgently needs your
donations if it is to continue its work to try to obtain public
oversight over the integrity of election results via mandatory routine
vote count audits and public access to election records and election
data, and public oversight over ballot security procedures. Donating
money to get out the vote efforts, to political candidates, or to
efforts to educate voters on issues, makes little difference if votes
are not accurately counted. NEDA can not continue its efforts without
funding.

http://electionarchive.org/fairelection/donate.html

THANK YOU. PLEASE PASS ON THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.

CONTACT: Kathy Dopp kathy@electionarchive.org 435-658-4657

--

Kathy Dopp, Executive Director, The National Election Data Archive

P.O. Box 682556
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org

History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf

Vote Yes on HR811 and S2295
http://electionmathematics.org/VoteYesHR811.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

Fox is still lame

2008-01-12T16:38:00.000-08:00

Let the recounting begin

2008-01-11T18:33:00.000-08:00

Press release indicates that state-wide recounts will begin in New Hampshire on Wednesday, January 16, 2008, for both the Democratic and Republican parties.

http://www.sos.nh.gov/recount%20press%20release.pdf

Boston.com really screwed up the vote totals -- Is this fraud video

2008-01-11T07:50:00.000-08:00

Kucinich Asks for New Hampshire Recount in the Interest of Election Integrity

2008-01-11T07:30:00.001-08:00

DETROIT–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Democratic Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich, the most outspoken advocate in the Presidential field and in Congress for election integrity, paper-ballot elections, and campaign finance reform, has sent a letter to the New Hampshire Secretary of State asking for a recount of Tuesdays election because of unexplained disparities between hand-counted ballots and machine-counted ballots.

I am not making this request in the expectation that a recount will significantly affect the number of votes that were cast on my behalf, Kucinich stressed in a letter to Secretary of State William M. Gardner. But, Serious and credible reports, allegations, and rumors have surfaced in the past few daysIt is imperative that these questions be addressed in the interest of public confidence in the integrity of the election process and the election machinery not just in New Hampshire, but in every other state that conducts a primary election.

He added, Ever since the 2000 election and even before the American people have been losing faith in the belief that their votes were actually counted. This recount isnt about who won 39% of 36% or even 1%. Its about establishing whether 100% of the voters had 100% of their votes counted exactly the way they cast them.

Kucinich, who drew about 1.4% of the New Hampshire Democratic primary vote, wrote, This is not about my candidacy or any other individual candidacy. It is about the integrity of the election process. No other Democratic candidate, he noted, has stepped forward to question or pursue the claims being made.

New Hampshire is in the unique position to address and, if so determined, rectify these issues before they escalate into a massive, nationwide suspicion of the process by which Americans elect their President. Based on the controversies surrounding the Presidential elections in 2004 and 2000, New Hampshire is in a prime position to investigate possible irregularities and to issue findings for the benefit of the entire nation, Kucinich wrote in his letter.

Without an official recount, the voters of New Hampshire and the rest of the nation will never know whether there are flaws in our electoral system that need to be identified and addressed at this relatively early point in the Presidential nominating process, said Kucinich, who is campaigning in Michigan this week in advance of next Tuesdays Presidential primary in that state.

New Jersey Passes Groundbreaking Election Reform Legislation

2008-01-09T17:35:00.000-08:00

Kathy Dopp of Utah reports:

Great News. New Jersey is the first state whose legislature has passed a scientifically-minded vote count auditing bill. As Fritz Scheuren, President of the American Statistical Association states,

"The key contribution of this legislation is to correct a common design flaw in the audit or verification of votes cast that calls for a fixed percent of the precincts to be recounted. The fixed percentage approach is just wrong, wasteful on the one hand and insufficient on the other."

However, despite its improved approach, the NJ audit bill contains some loopholes which could allow NJ's audits to be manipulated; and its language will have to be rewritten eventually because it does not allow for increased efficiency of auditing in the future as voting systems become more auditable.

An even better model vote count audit bill is being offered in the Utah legislature this session which has been reviewed and contributed to by county clerks and election auditing experts alike:

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/UT/VoteCountAudit-UT.pdf

The Utah bill language (above link) contains a new section which permits a two-stage audit. Stage one, would audit all vote counts except for provisional and absentee ballot counts, and stage two, after all provisional and absentee ballots are counted, then takes these new counts into account.

The Utah bill also will include a section requiring public access to and oversight over election records and ballot security procedures as described here:

http://utahcountvotes.org/legislature/PublicAccess2ElectionRecords4Utah.pdf

The final version of the Utah vote count audit bill, after it is drafted by expert legislative legal counsel, will be available soon.

New Jersey Citizens' Coalition on HAVA Implementation

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 8, 2008

Contact: Renee Steinhagen, HAVA Coalition Coordinator and Executive Director,
New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law Center

NEW JERSEY PASSES GROUNDBREAKING ELECTION REFORM LEGISLATION
Bill Combats Fraud by Requiring Random, Mandatory Audits of Election Results

Newark, NJ - Just after 1:00 a.m. this morning, voting on its last bill of the session, the New Jersey General Assembly passed legislation that will require random, mandatory audits of election results designed to detect outcome-reversing miscounts. Once signed by the governor, the provisions will take effect immediately, which will require all absentee ballots in the February primary to be subject to auditing. Once the voter-verifiable paper record is implemented, all ballots will be subject to audit.

The bill, which was sponsored by Senator Nia Gill (D-Essex), is being hailed as model legislation for election integrity. It was designed by the New Jersey Citizens' Coalition on the Implementation of HAVA (Help America Vote Act) with the assistance of a Ph.D. political scientist, experienced election integrity advocates from two states that have election auditing laws, Ph.D. statisticians from the American Statistical Association, and other voting rights advocates, all of whom worked pro bono.

One of the bill's most innovative features is that the margin of victory in a race will determine the extent of the audit. In closer races, more districts will be scrutinized, and the districts to be audited will be chosen at random. The process is transparent, nonpartisan, and completely independent of software. As a result, it provides a certified outcome that citizens can trust. With the passage of this bill, New Jersey is fast becoming a leader in election administration reform.

"This bill increases the transparency, security, and integrity of ballot counting and reporting in New Jersey, and moves us further toward the ultimate goal of fair and inclusive elections," said Renee Steinhagen, Coordinator of the Coalition and Executive Director of New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law Center.

"This bill marks the beginning of the end of our world of demon-haunted elections. It's the first post-election audit law to require electoral outcomes to be confirmed by a statistical audit, independent of software. This is a model for the nation. Even now the key provisions of this bill are being copied and tailored to meet other states' requirements," said Howard Stanislevic, Computer Network Engineer & Founder, E-Voter Education Project, who also worked on the bill.

Under the new legislation, the Attorney General will appoint an independent professional audit team of at least four members to supervise the audits conducted by election officials. Members will not have potential conflicts of interest (such as employment by the Attorney General, a political party or candidate, or a voting machine company or contractor). At least one member of the team will have verifiable expertise in the field of statistics, and another will have expertise in auditing. The audit team will develop a set of scientifically reasonable assumptions that will determine the size of the initial audit in each race on the ballot in question. Those
assumptions will be subject to public comment. The scientific framework will be designed to deliver the statistical power necessary to detect outcome-altering miscounts. If the results of the initial audit raise concerns, then the audit will be expanded until a truly accurate outcome can be determined.

The auditing process will be done by hand. Hand-counted totals of voter-verifiable paper records will be compared to the corresponding electronic vote counts in a minimum of 2% of the election districts in each county in which the audited election appears on the ballot. This procedure requires all counties to share the burden of audits proportional to their populations. Absentee ballots will be divided into audit units approximately equal in size to the average election district in each county in terms of the number of ballots cast, but will not be associated with any particular election district.

Fritz Scheuren, President of the American Statistical Association and one of the conceptual architects of the bill, stated, "The key contribution of this legislation is to correct a common design flaw in the audit or verification of votes cast that calls for a fixed percent of the precincts to be recounted. The fixed percentage approach is just wrong, wasteful on the one hand and insufficient on the other." He added, "The legislation achieves its ends by laying out a flexible process that should work well for all stakeholders. It does not attempt one-size-fits-all conformity. Given this recognition of the need for flexibility, the emphasis on using experts and on full transparency is just right."

For more information, contact Renee Steinhagen, Coordinator of the NJ Citizens' Coalition on the Implementation of HAVA and Executive Director of New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law Center at: New Jersey Appleseed Public Interest Law Center, www.njappleseed.net.

The bill is available for immediate download as a PDF at: http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3000/2730_R1.PDF

New Hampshire District Admits Ron Paul Votes Not Counted

2008-01-09T10:51:00.000-08:00

Carrie Hahn, Market Coordinator, Mt. Lebanon Uptown Farmer's Market, 412-337-1671 sent along this in an email to a public list:

Sutton township reported Congressman had zero votes, actual number was 31

Paul Joseph Watson, Prison Planet, Wednesday, January 9, 2008

The head clerk of the New Hampshire town of Sutton has been forced to admit that Ron Paul received 31 votes yet when the final amount was transferred to a summary sheet and sent out to the media, the total was listed as zero. The fiasco throws the entire primary into doubt and could lead to a re-count.

As we reported earlier today, an entire family voted for Ron Paul in Sutton, yet when the voting map on the Politico website was posted, the total votes for Ron Paul were zero.

Vote fraud expert Bev Harris contacted the head clerk in Sutton, Jennifer Call, who was forced to admit that the 31 votes Ron Paul received were completely omitted from the final report sheet, claiming "human error" was responsible for the mistake.

Two or three votes not counted could be a plausible mistake - but 31 votes for one candidate?

"The classic method for rigging a hand count is to write the wrong number on the form," Harris told the Alex Jones Show.

"They are counting everything in public real nice, they fill out a form in public real nice and then they transfer it to another form and they call that a summary sheet and then that is the one they send in," explained Harris.

"What happened is she said they did not transfer the number correctly and put zero instead of 31 - that is unacceptable as an answer."

With 100% of precincts now reporting, the map originally listed zero votes for Ron Paul as you can see below. It has now been updated to reflect the 31 votes Paul actually received.

The remainder of the 31 people in Sutton who voted for Ron Paul need to go public immediately with the charge of vote fraud and make it known that they were cheated out of their right to vote.

Harris estimates that it could cost the Ron Paul campaign as much as $67,000 dollars for a recount, but such a move could throw the entire primary into doubt, especially in light of the fact that Barack Obama appears to have been cheated out of a win by Hillary Clinton.

I'll try to contact her in the hours and days to come to hold a telephone conversation.

MoveOn.org Political Action: Paper ballots for the 2008 election

2008-01-08T09:20:00.000-08:00

MoveOn.org Political Action: Paper ballots for the 2008 election: "Paper ballots for the 2008 election"

MoveOn asks folks to sign petition in the wake of the NY Times article

2008-01-08T09:18:00.000-08:00

Dear MoveOn member,

This Sunday's cover story in The New York Times Magazine makes plain the threat: The winner of the 2008 presidential election could be decided by flawed, insecure, and hackable electronic voting machines.¹

This is the most prominent news coverage this issue has ever gotten, so it could be our one last chance to get this right before the election in November.

Congress is poised to consider a new emergency paper ballots bill next week—but we'll have to convince them to act right away.²

Can you sign this urgent petition asking local, state, and federal officials to require paper ballots for our votes? Clicking here will add your name:

http://pol.moveon.org/paper2008/o.pl?id=11873-6716194-SvU6bu&t=3

The petition says: "We must act quickly to secure our elections with paper ballots and audits before November."

Elections are run at the state level, so we'll deliver your signature and comments to local election officials in addition to members of Congress.

Electronic voting machines are so unreliable and insecure, we might elect the wrong person president in 2008. As The New York Times Magazine reports:

[Voting machines] fail unpredictably, and in extremely strange ways; voters report that their choices "flip" from one candidate to another before their eyes; machines crash or begin to count backward; votes simply vanish. (In the 80-person town of Waldenburg, Ark., touch-screen machines tallied zero votes for one mayoral candidate in 2006—even though he's pretty sure he voted for himself.) Most famously, in the November 2006 Congressional election in Sarasota, Fla., touch-screen machines recorded an 18,000-person "undervote" for a race decided by fewer than 400 votes.³

You can read more from this scary report at the end of this email—and forward it along to your friends and family. It's really compelling.

Congress hasn't been able to solve this problem yet, but there's one more chance next week. Rep. Rush Holt of New Jersey is expected to introduce an emergency bill to offer funding to states who switch from unreliable electronic voting machines to paper ballots and audits.⁴ We'll ultimately need a mandate for these things, but this bill would be a crucial first step to prevent some of the most dire threats to the 2008 election.

But to pass the bill in time, we'll need to light a fire under Congress. At the same time, we'll have to urge local election officials to read The New York Times Magazine story—and replace electronic voting machines with paper ballots and audits before November.

Sign this emergency petition to stop the threat from electronic voting machines right away. Click here to add your name:

http://pol.moveon.org/paper2008/o.pl?id=11873-6716194-SvU6bu&t=4

Thank you for all you do.

–Noah, Jennifer, Laura, Carrie, and the MoveOn.org Political Action Team
Tuesday, January 8th, 2008

P.S. Here's more from this week's disturbing New York Times Magazine story. Please forward this along to all your friends and family.

Can You Count on Voting Machines?

By CLIVE THOMPSON, The New York Times Magazine, January 6, 2008

Jane Platten gestured, bleary-eyed, into the secure room filled with voting machines. It was 3 a.m. on Nov. 7, and she had been working for 22 hours straight. "I guess we've seen how technology can affect an election," she said. The electronic voting machines in Cleveland were causing trouble again.

For a while, it had looked as if things would go smoothly for the Board of Elections office in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. About 200,000 voters had trooped out on the first Tuesday in November for the lightly attended local elections, tapping their choices onto the county's 5,729 touch-screen voting machines. The elections staff had collected electronic copies of the votes on memory cards and taken them to the main office, where dozens of workers inside a secure, glass-encased room fed them into the "GEMS server," a gleaming silver Dell desktop computer that tallies the votes.

Then at 10 p.m., the server suddenly froze up and stopped counting votes. Cuyahoga County technicians clustered around the computer, debating what to do. A young, business-suited employee from Diebold—the company that makes the voting machines used in Cuyahoga—peered into the screen and pecked at the keyboard. No one could figure out what was wrong. So, like anyone faced with a misbehaving computer, they simply turned it off and on again. Voilà: It started working—until an hour later, when it crashed a second time. Again, they rebooted. By the wee hours, the server mystery still hadn't been solved.

Worse was yet to come. When the votes were finally tallied the next day, 10 races were so close that they needed to be recounted. But when Platten went to retrieve paper copies of each vote—generated by the Diebold machines as they worked—she discovered that so many printers had jammed that 20 percent of the machines involved in the recounted races lacked paper copies of some of the votes. They weren't lost, technically speaking; Platten could hit "print" and a machine would generate a replacement copy. But she had no way of proving that these replacements were, indeed, what the voters had voted. She could only hope the machines had worked correctly.

Click here to keep reading:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06Vote-t.html

Then sign our urgent petition for paper ballots before the November election. Just click here to add your name:

http://pol.moveon.org/paper2008/o.pl?id=11873-6716194-SvU6bu&t=5

Sources:
1. "Can You Count on Voting Machines?," The New York Times Magazine, January 6, 2008
http://www.nytimes.com/magazine/

2. "Rep. Holt To Offer New Election Reform Proposal," National Journal Tech Daily, December 10, 2007
http://www.moveon.org/r?r=3310&id=&id=11873-6716194-SvU6bu&t=6

3. "Can You Count on Voting Machines?," The New York Times Magazine, January 6, 2008
http://www.nytimes.com/magazine/

4. "Rep. Rush Holt to Push for Paper Ballots and Vote Count Audits for 2008," AlterNet, December 27, 2007
http://www.alternet.org/democracy/71608/

Support our member-driven organization: MoveOn.org Political Action is entirely funded by our 3.2 million members. We have no corporate contributors, no foundation grants, no money from unions. Our tiny staff ensures that small contributions go a long way. If you'd like to support our work, you can give now at:

http://political.moveon.org/donate/email.html?id=11873-6716194-SvU6bu&t=7

PAID FOR BY MOVEON.ORG POLITICAL ACTION, http://pol.moveon.org/
Not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.

Join our TalkCast

2008-01-08T04:07:00.000-08:00

Podcast Announcement:

Join our PodCast Tue, January 8, 2008
Time: 10:00 PM EST

You have been invited to join a live Talkcast.

Listen to or Join a Talkcast - Episode: Electronic Voting Machines
http://www.talkshoe.com/talkshoe/web/talkCast.jsp?masterId=3181&cmd=tc
Host: Rauterkus - Mark@Rauterkus.com

The article in the NY Times magazine asks: Can You Count On These Machines?

By CLIVE THOMPSON, Published: January 6, 2008 is required reading
before the discussion.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06Vote-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&hp
http://tinyurl.com/37y4yj

We'll talk about that article in this talkcast, hosted by Mark
Rauterkus, with a special guest from Utah, Kathy Dopp. Kathy Dopp's
fact-finding and investigative efforts puts her at the head of the
class nation-wide. Dopp is a Mathematician and expert in election
audit mathematics and procedures. She resides in Park City, Utah and
has sites on the web: http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org http://utahcountvotes.org

Local Pennsylvania experts have been invited as well. Open to all
citizens, voters, advocates, candidates and even our friends in New
Hampshire.

Talkcast ID: 3181

Scheduled Time:

Date: Tue, January 8, 2008
Time: 10:00 PM EST

How to participate:

Call in:

1. Dial: (724) 444-7444
2. Enter: 3181 # (Talkcast ID)
3. Enter: 1 # or your PIN

or Join from your computer:
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--------------

The NY Times Magazine article heavily quotes Pittsburg Carnegie Mellon
University's Michael Shamos

A rebuttal to CMU's Michael Shamos was written by Arthur M. Keller,
Edward Cherlin, and David Mertz.
http://infolab.stanford.edu/pub/keller/2007/shamos-rebuttal-vocomp2007.pdf

As noted in their paper: "During those years he [Shamos] personally
examined more than 100 different computerized voting systems for
certification purposes. In the 2000 election, machines for which he
participated in certification (which did not include Florida) were
used to count more than 11% of the popular vote of the United States".

As David Webber notes, 'One can therefore attribute a large chunk of
the problems with current voting systems to the fact that Shamos
singularly failed to identify those during his "certification".'

Webber adds, "Shamos has all kinds of academic qualifications - but
absent from his resume is actual production implementation of systems.
His comments read like those of someone who has never actually built
real systems himself and deployed them for public use in mission
critical environments."

As the NY Times article notes: "IF YOU WANTED to know where the next
great eruption of voting-machine scandal is likely to emerge, you'd
have to drive deep into the middle of Pennsylvania." and "21
electoral-college votes, a relatively large number that could decide a
tight presidential race" where Michael Shamos has certified
touch-screen voting systems with no paper ballot records.
-------------

Another excellent response to the New York Times Magazine Article on E-voting
January 06, 2008
by Dan Wallach
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1244

--

Kathy Dopp

The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author
Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a
Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in
exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at

P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org

History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf

Vote Yes on HR811 and S2295
http://electionmathematics.org/VoteYesHR811.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

"Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body
and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote
Thomas Jefferson in 1816

Voting Machines - New York Times

2008-01-05T11:02:00.000-08:00

Voting Machines - Elections - Ballots - Politics - New York Times Can You Count On These Machines?

New vote system funded in Lackawanna County

2008-01-04T18:55:00.000-08:00

BY DAVID SINGLETON, STAFF WRITER

Lackawanna County taxpayers will catch a huge break on the acquisition of new voting machines.

The state Department of State agreed Monday to reimburse the county up to $1.7 million to help pay for a new voting system for the April 22 primary to replace the Advanced Voting Solutions electronic machines that were decertified last week.

Similar offers will be extended to Wayne and Northampton counties, which also have the now useless AVS touch-screen devices, Department of State spokeswoman Leslie Amoros said.

The announcement of the state?s decision came late Monday afternoon from the transition office of Democratic Commissioner Mike Washo and Commissioner-elect Corey O?Brien, who will become the majority on Jan. 7, 2008.

"This is a victory for all the taxpayers," Mr. O'Brien said at a hastily arranged news conference, where he and Mr. Washo were joined by attorneys Lawrence Moran and Gerard Karam, who have been working on the voting machine issue for the transition team,.

According to a letter to Mr. Moran and Mr. Karam from Harry VanSickle, who heads the state Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation, the department will reimburse the county for the procurement of a new voting system up to the invoice price of its AVS system.

In 2006, Lackawanna County purchased 500 electronic voting machines from AVS for $1.7 million. The new machines were necessary to bring the county into compliance with the federal Help America Vote Act, which barred the use of the mechanical lever machines voters had used since 1930.

Voters used the touch-screen machines in the 2006 primary and general elections and the 2007 primary. However, the state suspended certification of the machines for the November 2007 general election after AVS failed to gain federal certification, forcing the county to use paper ballots.

The state notified AVS on Friday that it was permanently decertifying the machines.

Mr. Washo said the transition team went to work on finding an alternative voting system immediately after the Nov. 6 election, working with officials in Wayne and Northampton counties, as well as the Department of State.

?They have ensured we are not going to be embarrassed in April,? he said.

The $1.7 million reimbursement from the state will come from three sources: $1.15 million from HAVA funding the state has received from the federal government, $328,000 from the county?s share of HAVA interest, and $231,000 from HAVA money already designated for use by the county.

The next step will be the selection of a new voting system.

The county will send representatives to a voting system vendor fair being hosted by Northampton County on Jan. 15. At least five manufacturers are expected to demonstrate their state-certified systems at the event, Mr. Karam said.

Assuming the county chooses a system shortly thereafter, employees in the Voter Registration Office would be trained on it during the month of February, with training for poll workers and voter education to take place in March and early April, he said.

Wayne County spent $295,000 to buy 100 AVS machines in 2006. Northampton spent $2.1 million to purchase 600 of the machines.

HOW EASY IS IT TO AUDIT ELECTIONS WITH 95% CONFIDENCE-LEVEL?

2007-12-22T19:14:00.000-08:00

The National Election Data Archive
Park City, UT
December 22, 2007

A new analysis using Utah's 2004 General Election results, finds that obtaining 95% confidence-level in election outcomes only requires auditing a reasonable 5.5% of all precinct races overall.

The National Election Data Archive has created a Powerpoint presentation showing simply "How to Determine Initial Sample Size for 95% Confidence-Level Vote Count Audits"

Mandatory Post-Election Vote Count Audits and a smaller pdf version of the slide presentation.

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/UT/VoteCountAudits.pdf

Counting overall 5.5% of Utah's precinct-race counts using this method achieves a higher confidence-level (95%) at lower cost than any flat manual election audit such as 10% audit Connecticut uses.

Utah's overall audit rates for the 2004 general election are:

For all federal and state races audited - 5.4% of precincts

* Federal & Statewide Races total precincts audited - average 3% of precincts

* State Senate Races total precincts audited - average 11.2% of precincts

* State House Races total precincts audited - average 30.9% of precincts

The minimum required audit rate for a race is 1.5% and maximum audit rate is 100% for one close Utah State House race. Audit amounts will vary state by state depending on the number of close races and how many vote counts there are in each race.

Typically a larger overall percentage of precincts must be audited, but not a larger "amount" of precincts, for races with fewer total number of precincts. The last slide in NEDA's powerpoint presentation explains why a flat percentage audit of precincts (or other vote counts) - the approach adopted by most states currently - is
mathematically incorrect.

A general rule of thumb for that can be applied without using any fancy mathematics, was suggested by M.I.T. Professor Ronald Rivest: An estimate the audit sample size for any race can be obtained by dividing one (1) by the margin (in percentage of ballots) between the winning candidate with the least number of votes and the runnerup (the losing candidate with the most votes). This easy calculation (1/margin%) is not precisely accurate but provides a confidence-level of somewhere between 70% to 100%. Eg. if the margin is 1%, then manually audit 1/0.01 = 100 vote counts; and if the margin is 50%, then manually audit 1/0.50 = 2 vote counts. More precise methods to determine vote count audit sample sizes are described in the National Election Data Archive's powerpoint presentation.

The powerpoint presentation also includes a description of a new method by Aslam, Popa, and Rivest for weighting random selection of precincts by the amount of possible error that the precinct could contribute to the margin between the winning and losing candidates.

NEDA is also releasing a spreadsheet to make it easy to see how to calculate vote count audit sample sizes using unofficial election results:
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/UT/GeneralElection2004-Audits.xls

MODEL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR 95% CONFIDENCE-LEVEL VOTE COUNT AUDITS:

After developing legislative language for election auditing since January 2008 in consultation with various experts, the National Election Data Archive finalized a legislative model for election auditing:

Legislative Text Requiring 95% Confidence-Level Election Audits.
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/UT/VoteCountAudit-UT.pdf

The National Election Data Archive recommends combining its bill text with a
Legislative Request for PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTION RECORDS:

http://utahcountvotes.org/legislature/PublicAccess2ElectionRecords4Utah.pdf

Currently no state yet subjects its election results to scientific independent election audits.

The 95% confidence-level vote count audit legislation proposed:

1. uses a flexible definition for "vote counts" so that precincts, machine counts, batch counts or even individual ballots can be the unit audited - depending on the capabilities of the voting systems (most are not auditable on the ballot level currently).

2. uses scientific definitions for "random selection" and "confidence-level" to flexibly permit any valid auditing procedure that will assure that at most 5% of incorrect election outcomes would be certified (since we expect far fewer than 100% of outcomes to be incorrect, this assures that well more than 95% of election outcomes are correct)

3. specifies procedures ensuring that audits cannot be manipulated or overcome

4. specifies specific responsibilities for auditors and election officials, and establishes an expert State "Election Audit and Recount Committee" that is appointed by expert department chairs of math, computer science, and political science departments

5. specifies publicly observable manual counts and random selections

THE TEN PRECEPTS OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The Utah Voter Magazine of the League of Women Voters - Utah printed a long article I wrote about the

Ten Precepts of Election Administration, The State of Utah's Voting, Technology, and Legislative Requests for Changing Utah Election Law

http://www.lwvutah.org/VOTERS/Winter%20Voter%2008.pdf

With thanks to Douglas Kellner and Doug Jones.

Pages 13 to 15.

There is one small correction to the article. There are only 7 states so far which have implemented Election Day voter registration, not 22 states.

A FEDERAL RIGHT TO PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTION RECORDS:

Funds are urgently needed immediately by the National Election Data Archive in order to continue its legal effort to establish a federal right to public oversight over the electoral process.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not provide public access to election records, even in federal elections because FOIA only applies to records owned by the federal government. Election records are owned by local state, county, and townships. A public right to access election records for all federal elections must be established if there is to be public oversight over the electoral process.

Since June 2006, the National Election Data Archive has brought the only case to federal court that is currently suing a state in order to establish a federal right to public access to election records.

Even with scientific vote count audits, if there is no public access to view election records, then the public cannot verify the integrity of elections. It took the National Election Data Archive 1.5 years to bring its public access to election records case into federal court.

We have spent $5,000 on the case so far, but are virtually out of funds and may need as much as $20,000 more, or alternatively pro-bono or contingency attorneys to finish the case.

PLEASE help us financially or we will have to drop this crucially important legal case within a few weeks.

There is no other case currently in federal court that is poised to establish a nation-wide right to public access to election records (and hence public oversight over elections). There is also no federal legislation proposed currently in Congress to establish a federal right to public access to election records.

If we have to drop this federal court case now due to lack of funds and legal help, it could take another two years to bring another similar legal case to this point. This is crucial and without your help our federal legal suit to establish a federal right to election oversight and access to records will be dropped. Here is our current legal filing with the court:

http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/USCV-FedCase-Complaint.PDF

Our legal case is ideally suited to establish a federal right to public access to election records because:

Utah current election statute is possibly the most secretive with respect to public access to election records of any State currently. Clearly Utah law violates of federal statute such as the National Voter Registration Act which requires public access to voter registration records.

Utah current election statute is clearly unworkable because it is being violated during every election by Utah's own election officials in order to perform their jobs of tallying votes.

Prior federal case law has established that the right to vote includes the right to have that vote accurately counted, and this right to have votes accurately counted cannot be verifiably assured without the right to "know" that votes are accurately counted, and this knowledge cannot be established without a public right to access election records.

To establish a federal right to public access to election records only requires winning that right in one federal case in one state. The right to public oversight over elections via public access to election records can be won here in Utah for the entire nation, but only if we have funding and legal resources to continue the case that we have spent almost two years getting to federal court.

Here is how you can donate to help fight for a federal right to public oversight over elections, and finish the mountain of work that is still required to make it possible for U.S. elections to become verifiably transparently accurate.

Please donate now. We need to raise at least a few thousand dollars immediately, and perhaps as much as $20,000 to cover all costs for this federal court case to establish a public right to access election records for the entire nation.

In Pima County, AZ, the Arizona court recently decided that the plaintiffs had a right to obtain and examine copies of the Diebold/Premier's GEMS server vote count database. Following the 2004 election, an AK court decided that the Alaska Democratic Party had a right to obtain copies of the Diebold GEMS server vote count database. Unfortunately neither of these cases establishes a nation-wide right for public access to similar election records. We need funding NOW to continue the only federal court case that is positioned to achieve this right for the entire nation.

Without a public right to access election records, there can be no public oversight over elections. It is urgent that we obtain funds now or we will be forced to drop this particular effort.

There have been "no" responses to my prior two pleas for funding for this crucial lawsuit. Please donate now:

http://electionarchive.org/fairelection/donate.html

or mail a check to:
US Count Votes
P.O. Box 682556
Park City, UT 84068

If you want US Count Votes to continue our legal effort to establish a federal right to public access to election records, please donate something now. Thank you.

There is also a lot of work remaining to explain the procedures for evaluating election auditing discrepancy results in order to make valid decisions for whether to certify an election or increase the audit sample.

We need your help to get that done in a timely fashion.

VOLUNTEER POSITION OR FUND-RAISING POSITION AVAILABLE

A full-time (4 day/week) volunteer position is open in Park City, UT. Possible college credit can be obtained from your college or this could turn into a paid position for someone who can successfully organize fund-raising events.

Thank you.

Press Contact
Kathy Dopp,
Executive Director, National Election Data Archive
435-658-4657
--

Kathy Dopp

The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at

P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org

History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf

Vote Yes on HR811 and S2295
http://electionmathematics.org/VoteYesHR811.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

"Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body
and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote
Thomas Jefferson in 1816

Closing the chapter on eVote software, the add-on for Mailman and Majordomo

2007-12-15T11:43:00.001-08:00

Hello eVote fans,

I'm sorry to announce that I'm bringing down deliberate.com's list and voting services.

Our active petition is moving to thepetitionsite.com.

Some political action lists are moving to riseup.net.

These eVote-related lists will simply stop functioning in the next week or so.

Interest in eVote has been meager, at best. So I feel the need to move it to the past and take up new things, including election voting on the internet.

The source code lives at sourceforge.com and, presumably, will be there forever.

Thank you for your support in the past.

Marilyn Davis

Another step towards verifiable accurate elections nation-wide.

2007-12-15T11:05:00.000-08:00

Ohio joins NM, FL, VA, CA, MD (and other states and jurisdictions) which scrapped or are phasing out the flawed touch-screen digital recording electronic (DRE) voting systems which use electronic ballots which voters cannot see, counted by trade-secret software (and joins the many jurisdictions whose leaders initially purchased more economical, trustworthy paper ballot systems).

On Friday, Dec. 14th the results of Ohio's Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner's "Everest Voting System Review" were released:

http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/info/everest.aspx
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/info/EVEREST/00-SecretarysEVERESTExecutiveReport.pdf

The Results of Ohio's Source Code Analysis and Red Team (Penetration) Testing Include:

Premier (Diebold Voting Systems):
* Failure To Effectively Protect Vote Integrity
* Failure to Effectively Protect Vote Privacy
* Failure to Protect Elections From Malicious Insiders
* Failure to Validate and Protect Software
* Failure to Follow Standard Software and Security Engineering Practices
* Failure to Provide Trustworthy Auditing

Hart Voting Systems:
* Failure To Effectively Protect Election Data Integrity
* Failure To Eliminate Or Document Unsafe Functionality
* Failure To Protect Election From "Malicious Insiders"
* Failure To Provide Trustworthy Auditing

ES&S Voting Systems:
* Failure to Protect Election Data and Software.
* Failure to Effectively Control Access to Election Operations
* Failure to Correctly Implement Security Mechanisms
* Failure to Follow Standard Software and Security Engineering Practices

Ohio's SOS Brunner is recommending removing all voting machines from the polls (even optical scan voting equipment) except for voting machines required by federal statute to allow voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently - and is recommending counting all ballots with a high-speed central count system at county election offices.

News articles (taken from the Daily Voting News) on the subject include:

OH: Study: Voting Systems Vulnerable
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/info/everest.aspx

OH: Brunner declares Ohio's voting systems vulnerable
http://www.columbusdispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2007/12/14/vote.html

OH: Brunner: Ohio's vote vulnerable
http://blog.cleveland.com/openers/2007/12/brunner_ohios_vote_vulnerable.html

OH: Report finds voting equipment flaws
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20071214/FREE/71214014/1008&Profile=1008

OH: Ohio's electronic voting system vulnerable, report says
http://www.ohio.com/news/break_news/12505391.html

OH: Ohio Secretary of State confirms 2004 election could have been stolen
http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2007/2920

OH: Official: Ohio Vote Machines Vulnerable
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/12/14/ap4442329.html

OH: Statement of Premier Election Solutions in Response to Today's
Release of the Ohio EVEREST Voting System Review
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news_press_release,242777.shtml

OH: 'Critical Security Failures' Leads Ohio Sec. Of State To Recommend
Ban of DRE (Touch-Screen) Voting Machines
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5443

OH: Cuyahoga County - Secretary of State wants new voting system in
Cleveland
http://www.ohio.com/news/ap?articleID=284686&c=y

----

Please take a few minutes to call your US Representative and Senator to support Rep. Rush Holt and Senator Bill Nelson's election reform bills that would assist states to pay for replacing their flawed high-cost DRE voting systems with paper ballot voting systems that are less costly, more reliable, and fully auditable, and provide funding
for conducting manual counts (audits) of paper ballots to verify the accuracy of machine counts.

http://senate.gov and http://www.house.gov

Cheers,

Kathy Dopp

The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at

P.O. Box 680192, Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org

History of Confidence Election Auditing Development & Overview of
Election Auditing Fundamentals
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/History-of-Election-Auditing-Development.pdf

Vote Yes on HR811 and S2295
http://electionmathematics.org/VoteYesHR811.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

"Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1816

UPDATE on HR811:

2007-09-12T13:07:00.000-07:00

Friends,

Good news. The Washington Post published my letter to the editor
today. Thank you to all who asked the Post to publish it. I could not
find an online version, so here is a scan someone sent me.

http://electionmathematics.org/em-voting-systems/images/WashPostLtr.TIF

FYI, my local county newspaper published a story about my lawsuit to
establish public access to election records. Can you believe the
Summit County, Utah Attorney claims that if the public were allowed to
look at the poll books and know what the polling location vote counts
on each DRE machine were - that would enable the public to tamper with
the votes!

http://www.parkrecord.com/todaysheadlines/ci_6863735
The vote has been postponed to the week of Sept. 17th.

According to the National Association of Counties (NACo) Action Alert,
http://capwiz.com/naco/issues/alert/?alertid=10264906&PROCESS=Take+Action
we only have a few days to convince our Representatives to vote "YES"
on HR811 and to vote "NO" on the unfunded mandate amendment to keep
the 2008 deadlines for manual election auditing in tact. Weigh in by
this Friday, September 14!! Keep calling and faxing your members of
Congress. Your member of Congress has been asked to let leadership
know how they intend to vote by Tuesday at 4 p.m. We MUST get our
response to Members of Congress by Monday at the latest!

Every House member will receive a copy of NACo's anti-HR811 flier
http://electionmathematics.org/em-legislation/vote-no-NACo.doc

So I will try to have a one-page flier ready to go by tomorrow to
rebut it. If any of you can spare the time to help craft our flier,
or either fax copies of our position and response (when it is done) to
all the House members or distribute copies in person in DC by next
Monday, please plan on devoting some time tomorrow, Friday, and
Monday.

Thank you.

PLEASE DONATE - WE NEED FUNDS TO CONTINUE OUR WORK

Thank you to the people who donated about $250 so far. We need more.
Please donate to the National Election Data Archive. We urgently need
to raise sufficient funds to hire an additional staff person to keep
up with the growing work-load. NEDA could accomplish a lot more if
there were sufficient donations to pay just one person's salary. (Our
financials are available here for your review:
http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/financial/FinancialStmts2004-2006.pdf)
PLEASE donate whatever amount you can by credit card, PayPal, or by
mailing a check. Even $5 or $10/month would be a big help. Please
donate. We need your on-going help. Thank you. See
http://electionarchive.org/fairelection/donate.html

"Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have
acted; the indifference of those who should have known better; the
silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most; that has made
it possible for evil to triumph" Haile Selassie

Sincerely,

Kathy Dopp
Executive Director, National Election Data Archive
http://electionarchive.org

CQPolitics.com - State Officials’ Opposition Could Jeopardize Voting ‘Paper Trail’ Measure

2007-09-09T19:20:00.000-07:00

CQPolitics.com - State Officials’ Opposition Could Jeopardize Voting ‘Paper Trail’ Measure: "State Officials’ Opposition Could Jeopardize Voting ‘Paper Trail’ Measure By Kathleen Hunter | 7:06 AM; Sep. 06, 2007 | Email This Article Strong opposition from state and local officials is threatening to derail an election-machine bill originally slated to come to the House floor Thursday."

Electronic Voting in West Virginia for 2008 Presidential Primary

2007-09-06T10:57:00.000-07:00

WVGOP Presidential Convention, Inc.

For Immediate Release, September 6, 2007

Contact: Gary Abernathy 304-344-4671 or Lynn Staton 304-229-5890

Attn: Political Editors and Reporters

WVGOP Presidential Convention Announces Important Convention Details

Charleston, WV -- The WVGOP Presidential Convention announced today the following information to inform West Virginia Republicans about the electronic voting and delegate selection process in advance of the 2008 Republican Presidential Convention.

"In June of this year, we announced the bold step that West Virginia is taking in 2008 to have a convention on February 5, 2008 to select a majority of our delegates to the Republican National Convention. This is the first time that West Virginia will hold such a convention, and it is certain to increase West Virginia's impact on the 2008 presidential race," said Bob Fish, CEO of the WVGOP Presidential Convention, Inc.

"In order to ensure that all West Virginians are aware of how they can be involved in the process, we are releasing today the information on how to register to vote electronically and how to be a delegate to the state convention," Fish continued.

Electronic Voting

On-line voting and county convention voting will be held between January 1 and January 14. The results of the county convention and on-line voting will be combined to produce the result in each county and the winners will be certified as delegates to the State Convention on February 5, 2008 in Charleston.

All registered Republicans may participate in the election of delegates to the State Convention. Voting will be on-line. Additionally, a county may decide to hold a county convention.

On-line voting is very similar to regular absentee voting by mail. The voter will contact the State Party on-line, by phone, or by mail and request a voter ID and password. The dates for registration are October 1 to November 30, 2007.

The state party may be reached at:

West Virginia Republican Party
PO Box 2711
Charleston, WV 25330
Phone: 304-768-0493
Fax: 304-768-6083

Web: www.wvgopconvention.com or www.wvgop.org

After verification, the voter's materials will be sent by mail to their home of record, and the voter can then go on-line and cast his or her ballot. On-line voting and county convention voting will be held between January 1 and January 14.

The on-line voting software is maintained on a secure server and is completely protected. The program will display the county's candidates for delegate in random order, so each voter's screen will display the same candidates but in varying order. Each candidate for delegate may designate a presidential candidate who he or she favors.

That candidate, if designated, will also be displayed on the ballot.

It will not be necessary that the voter have e-mail or internet access in their home in order to vote. Public libraries have computers that can be used for this purpose. The voter would simply access the voting site, enter his or her voter ID and password, and vote. The results of the on-line voting will be combined with the results of the county convention, if held, to determine the winners in each county. The results of the on-line voting will not be released to county officials until after the county convention results are filed. The delegates for each county will be certified January 18th.

Delegates to the State Convention

Delegates to the Convention have been apportioned to each county. About 60% come from recognized Republican groups ? County Committees, State Committee, and Republican Legislators. The remaining delegates come from county bonus delegates who will be selected by on-line voting and a county convention. While holding a county convention is not required, it is encouraged that every county hold a county convention as it maximizes the opportunity for participation in this process. Those interested in learning if a county convention is being held in their respective county should contact a Republican committee member in their county.

All delegates and delegate candidates will be required to register with the State Party and pay a registration fee of $25. The filing period to register is November 1 ? 30, 2007. Delegate candidates may have the name of the presidential candidate they support listed along with their name on the county ballot. Each delegate may appoint an alternate, although proxy voting and "double voting" will not be
allowed.

For those who wish to be a delegate to the state convention, please visit www.wvgopconvention.com and print the registration form found under the "How to be a Delegate" section. Once completed, please mail it with your registration fee to the WV Republican Party at the address listed above. He or she will then be a delegate candidate, and fellow Republicans in that respective county will select among the delegate candidates by voting. If successful in voting, that delegate candidate will be certified as a delegate to the state convention on February 5, 2008 in Charleston.

Should you have any questions about Electronic Voting or how to become a delegate please email wvgopconvention@gmail.com.

Allegheny County panel still reviewing voting machines

2007-08-27T06:26:00.000-07:00

Allegheny County panel still reviewing voting machines

Transcript from Dan Rather's show: The Trouble with Touch Screens

2007-08-15T12:07:00.000-07:00

The transcript for Dan Rather's "The Trouble with Touch Screens" is available on-line.

Dan Rather reveals the lack of quality control in manufacturing ES&S touchscreens and shocking new revelations about the Florida 2000 election.

Dan Rather talks to former workers at the Sequoia printing plant in California. The workers explained how they were ordered to send West Palm Beach inferior punch cards in the Summer and Fall of 2000. These cards were printed on poor quality paper and purposely misprinted. The cards were actually expected to fail during voting and counting, which they did. And Sequoia's workers were subsequently ordered to hide the evidence.

Clearly a series of conscious acts on the part of management at Sequoia Voting Systems, who ordered the sabotage of West Palm Beach's election, was part of a plan to sell its more profitable touchscreen voting machines. It was a coordinated attack from a printing plant in California on the election recount process in Florida.

The events that set the stage for our current voting system disaster.

Here is a copy of the HD.net transcript which I made more readable by changing the case and inserting some extra paragraphs:

Tonight the trouble with touch screens screens, even if it's just off a 1/4 of an inch it can throw a vote upper or lower to the other candidate and you have the wrong selection and you really don't realize it. The story of companies that built 1,000s of new age voting machines for elections all across America with touch screens that were unreliable we were rejecting at the time. Anywhere from 30-40% of the touch screens that came in, wait a minute, you were rejecting. At that time 30-40% of the touch screens you were getting in from Bergquist?

That's correct.

Also tonight, the paper trial. And I think that everybody's opinion was this: 2000 election was going to be our demise because of the poor quality that we put out the door. Workers responsible for making paper ballots that led to the Florida fiasco of 2000 tell their story for the first time. It's a sad state of affairs that it takes 7 years for somebody to actually ask the question to the people that might have
the answer.

A special investigative report on the machines that count America's votes tonight on Dan Rather reports.

Good evening, from West Palm Beach, Florida. Nothing is more fundamental to the story of America, and what it means to be an American, than the vote. A free people, voting with the guarantee of a secret ballot, holds a privileged place among our most cherished civic institutions. Voting also represents an exercise in faith -- a faith that after one drops one's ballot in a box, or pulls a lever, or presses a button on a screen one's vote will be counted. Recent elections have sorely tested our American faith in the sanctity of the vote. Few places in the country symbolize this strained faith more than the building behind me - the Palm Beach county courthouse, scene of some of the fiercest fights during the 2000 election mess in Florida. But that contest seven years ago is by no means the only one that has raised questions and some of the measures that resulted from that episode - such as new voting machines - have spawned questions of their own.

Today (applause). I am proud to announce that I am a candidate for
congress for 2008! This is Christine Jennings. In November of 2006 she
lost the House race for Florida's 13th congressional district. But
Jennings, a Democrat, is already back--running again. I will fight
every single day for the privilege of being the people's
representative for district 13!

She lost the 2006 race by a only few hundred votes. But her defeat
made headlines, not because of votes counted- but because of votes
that may not have been counted at all. Mysteriously, 18,000 voters in
Sarasota County -about 13% of all voters there- appeared to have cast
no votes at all in the race for this seat in the House of
Representatives this rate of so-called under-votes was much higher
than for other counties in the congressional district.

Jennings didn't believe that thousands of voters had intentionally not
voted in her race. She blamed the touch screen voting machines and she
had her reasons. On the first or second day of early voting, we
started getting calls from voters telling us there was a problem with
the screen, with them trying to vote for me on the review screen. And
in addition, voters here called the Sarasota herald tribune, they
called the radio stations. Voters, we have hundreds of voters that
signed affidavits that said, " those machines did not work properly."
those " machines" were the " Ivotronic," touch screen voting machine,
manufactured by Election Systems & Software Of Omaha, Nebraska Es&S
which claims to be the world's largest election systems provider. Is
privately held. The company says that over 67 million voters cast
their ballots on Es&S equipment last November, in some 22 states. And
just after Election Day many voters in Jennings' race said something
wasn't right with the voting machines. When I went to review my vote,
the 13th district came up as I didn't vote. I went to check it and her
name wasn't there. I hit the square, the x came up, I continued voting
down to the end, went to the review page, it wasn't on there, it
wasn't there. It came up that Christine's vote did not go through. I'm
hoping that my vote did get counted. 18, 000 votes missing is a big
mistake and a big error for this county and it should be corrected.
Jennings sued the state and ES&S, saying the machines had
malfunctioned. She never conceded the race and filed an election
challenge with the U.S. House of Representatives.

Christine Jennings has made a career out of insisting that numbers be
right. She had started out as a bank teller in Ohio, moved to Florida
and eventually founded her own bank in Sarasota. Running for congress
was her first venture into politics the one thing that I want - it's
very simple - the truth, the truth about what happened in this
election Jennings' race wasn't the first time serious questions had
been raised about the Ivotronics.

Voters all over the country had complained that these voting machines
had registered their selections incorrectly. Besides Florida, problems
with recording votes on the Ivotronics were reported in Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, And Texas. Just in the last
election.

But there may have been a special problem in Florida in 2006. ES&S had
sent Florida election officials a memo that summer warning of a
software glitch that could cause misvoting-and saying the company
would fix the problem. Surprisingly, neither ES&S nor the state did
anything to resolve the problem before the November election. Sarasota
didn't even post warning signs for voters in the polls, which ES&S had
provided! Still, a state-sponsored audit concluded the Sarasota
machines had worked fine.

So why did 18 thousand people not vote in that house race? Many voting
analysts blamed a confusing ballot layout for the undervote but
Jennings wasn't buying it. Her case -and cause- led to hearings in
congress--. I am going to ask that the GAO and the National Institute
of Standards and Technology really conduct a top to bottom
investigation of these particular machines. Christine Jennings was in
attendance, bringing her local spotlight to a national problem. And
it's at the heart of our democracy and people from across this country
have made it clear to me they want to know that their vote counts and
they have encouraged me to keep this up so that we get to the place
that every vote counts.

Back in Florida, the Jennings race confirmed what some officials had
known for years. Gene Hinspeter has been an elections operations
specialist for Lee County- that's the Ft. Myers area-- for thirteen
years. He discovered a serious problem with the Ivotronic voting
machines in 2003, which he recreated for us in a demonstration. In
2003 we noticed there was a calibration issue with the Ivotronic touch
screen and we brought it up to the people that maintain our voting
equipment. And this is just a little example of what we saw. If you
select the first box, if it is off enough. It would make another
selection. It is not exactly where you make your selection at. As you
see, I am selecting the top box and this second box is highlighting.
Lee County returned all 1800 of its Ivotronics to ES&S to have screens
replaced, but problems continued.

For Hinspeter, the machines were a high maintenance headache. We
started out with two employees when we were doing punch card, and when
we switched over to the Ivotronic we basically had to triple our staff
because the hands-on is just so intense. You know before you let the
machine go out, you test it, you calibrate it, you check the date and
time. There's so many things that need to be done before it goes out.
It's not like you can just pull it out of the rack, throw it in the
booth and send it out. We have to bring in a team of people that cast
ballots on each one of these machines to make sure that it's working
properly. And even after all that, there were still problems it seems
like they will work today and tomorrow they might not work. I can use
ten of them in a test and then we will go ahead and get ready to send
them out after the test and we will check them just before they go out
the door and we will find that one is not working properly. So, they
are just unreliable in my opinion how could machines that had cost
taxpayers millions all over the United States be so unpredictable?

According to ES&S, there are 97,000 Ivotronic machines in use across
the country! Most of us use touch screens every day. From the ATM
machines to the latest in cell phone technology. They have to be
right. So what was the problem with these voting machines?

Our investigation of the ES&S Ivotronic took us not to company
headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska but half a world away.

These are the shantytowns of Manila home to the Teletech factory
where, since 1999, Filipino workers have been cranking out touch
screen machines that were used in Florida and other states.

Some workers came forward to talk to us, but were so afraid of the
factory owner that they would speak only from the shadows.

What was happening inside the plant? According to this employee and
many others exhausted Philipppino workers. Rushed production. Poor
quality.

It took us nearly two months in Manila to finally persuade one former
worker to talk to us in daylight. Eddie Vibar is an electrical
engineer who worked at the factory between 1999 and 2002.

Vibar says he worked on thousands of voting machines shipped to the
United States with what he says was virtually no testing done on them.
Originally, a fraction of the machines underwent a so-called vibration
test. And what was this quality control test for machines on which
Americans would cast hundreds of thousands of votes?

This manual shake-test, would have been a joke at any quality
electronics factory. But Vibar says that even this crude test was only
done on a fraction of the machines. Why? Because, Vibar says,
management didn't want to slow down production. But almost nothing may
have affected the workers- or the machines -- like the crushing heat
and humidity of Manila -- in a factory with only a few air
conditioners, often broken or turned off. Vibar recalls days when the
temperature inside rose to over ninety degrees.

Americans cast ballots for mayors, senators and even the president on
these vital machines! They cost some three thousand dollars apiece. So
how did they end up being manufactured here like this? Enter factory
director, Edwin Ching. The Ching family holds a majority interest in
the Manila factory - but also in this American company pivot,
international, a contract engineering firm in Lenexa, Kansas. In 1997
ES&S contracted with pivot international to make its voting machines.
The Chings may seem odd business partners for ES&S. The family has a
widely-questioned reputation in Philipppine business circles and
strong connections in top political circles. The Chings have been sued
in the Philipppines--and investigated there -- for their alleged
business practices, possible tax evasion, and shoddy real estate
developments. They have not been convicted of anything. Meanwhile the
family lives in seclusion behind the walls of their compound on
Paradise Street

Vibar says that while the Chings made millions, their employees got
sweatshop pay.

Some of the Ivotronic's components come from factories in Taiwan and
mainland china - but perhaps the most important component- the screen
itself- came from America's heartland -- the Bergquist Company In
Chanhassen, Minnesota. And it was the American-made screens-- that
began to most concern the Filipino workers, like this former employee.

Back in the states ES&S began falling behind in deliveries of
Ivotronics. Pivot sent an American, Landen Tuggle, from Kansas to
manage the factory. The factory was fairly dismal at that time. In the
basement area where we end up putting a lot of our materials, our
inventories and everything, I think I probably hauled 50 dump truck
loads of cats and rats and snakes and all types of-- debris Landen
Tuggle is known in manufacturing circles for his success upgrading
troubled factories of various kinds to first-class status. He says
that he eventually did just that in Manila -- but it took time. The
Filipino workers recall Tuggle as the first American to care about
them and not just the machines,

They came to Tuggle with problems about working conditions- but also
about problems with the machines, especially the screens.. After I got
over there-- it took me awhile to-- get the Filipinos to open-- up to
me. You have to understand the culture over there. Filipinos don't
wanna give you bad news. You know what I mean? So each time something
failed-- they not only hated it, they took it personally. But as we
got the lines set up and began the manufacturing-- they came to me and
said, "sir-- these are no good." I said, "What's the problem?" they
said, "sir, there-- the bubble-- they're pillowing." " they're
billowing." what does that mean? Pillowing. It means that the surface
of the touch screen, the plastic or Mylar surface, was not stretched
taut. It had a like a bubble or even rolls, two or three rolls to it
on the touch screen. Did you tell anybody what the Philipppine workers
had told you? Yes, I did. I got on the phone. We began to make calls.
. So, you were sounding the alarm as far back as 2001? Yes. We were
rejecting at a time anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of the touch
screens that came in. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. You were rejecting
at that time 30 to 40 percent of the touch screens that you were
getting in from Bergquist? -that's correct Jonathan San Pedro was the
production manager at Teletech from 1994 to 2004. He worked closely
with Tuggle as Tuggle introduced real quality control standards
Bergquist was alarmed, because of the significant numbers of defect,
or reject units that affected the because of the Bergquist
touchscreens. So someone eventually came over to the Philipppines to
help you address this problem. Oh, yes. Pivot responded immediately.
But they were or were not able to bring it up to top quality. Where
you had very few rejects. No. ES&S continued to produce thousands of
Ivotronic machines using the Bergquist screens. Did no one at pivot or
ES&S ever just say, stop this train. We're getting off. We can't
produce these machines at extremely high quality. Did anybody ever say
that? No. Unh-uh

Did you think about it at the time? Of course I did. Any idea how many
were shipped to the us that you feel were potentially defective? I
would say probably in the neighborhood of 15-16,000-- units. A great
many of them destined for Florida. Some of the writings about this,
say that the biggest problem was something called loss of calibration.
What is that? When you take the stylus. And you put it on the x.
Instead of making the dot there on the touch screen. Or where you're
where you're putting it. It would move off and move to a different
location. Showing that it thought the stylus was being touched over
here Jonathan San Pedro says that the more Ivotronic units the workers
produced, and the more they tested, the more calibration problems they
found when we hit our output target that time, which is they re
expecting to increase our capacity, we noticed that many units failed
the calibration test now, were pivot, ES&S and/or Bergquist worried
that this calibration problem might affect the proper recording of
votes? I don't recall anyone ever discussing that they were concerned
about votes. Well, we have a letter from-- Bergquist stating that they
were unaware of the issues with the problematic screens at the time of
manufacture.

Well-- that's simply not true. Did you say it was simply not true?
Yeah. Bergquist said the problem was not so much with their screens as
with the way the Manila plant was inspecting them. Tuggle disagrees.
Berquist said the plant in Manila didn't know how to inspect them.
(laughter) you're chuckling. Why is that? Again, that's simply not
true. Again, I had degreed engineers. You're talking about a third
world country but they had some good colleges there. My people were
very good - they were engineers. I had assembly workers who were
college graduates.

Tuggle admits some design problems with the Ivotronic, but he worried
most about the screens, and that, over time, they would fail your
story suggests, mr. Tuggle Bergquist and pivot and ES&S all knew that
there were potential defects in these screens. That could put the
accuracy of the vote by millions of Americans at risk?

Well-- I would say that based upon their calculations, they were all
taking the calculated risk that they would not deteriorate any
further. And it was very evident that that was a risk they were
willing to take. What about the risk at the voting place? You'll have
to ask them about that.

Executives from pivot, Bergquist and ES&S all declined to talk to us.
But they didn't decline to testify in a federal lawsuit and that's how
we found out what was really going on at all three companies a
critical legal document in the battle over Florida's touchscreens was
filed far from Sarasota, in the United States district court house
here in Minneapolis, in a case that almost no one has even heard
about. The case, Bergquist versus Hartford Casualty, began two years
ago. It seemed at first a simple dispute between a policyholder and
insurance company. Bergquist, the company that manufactured the
screens used in the ES&S Ivotronic was seeking reimbursement for costs
incurred in recalling and replacing thousands of potentially defective
touch screens, most in voting machines in Florida. An affidavit in the
case, recently filed, looks like just one more document in a mountain
of court papers. But the affidavit of dr. Patricia dunn, a former
materials scientist for the Bergquist company, was a bombshell. Dunn
discovered no data of humidity testing on the screens by Bergquist
even though they were telling customers the screens met certain
humidity specifications but when patricia dunn conducted her own
experiments at Bergquist they suggested that many screens would go out
of calibration over time, especially in humid places like Florida.
According to dunn, in 2002 she urged a recall of many Bergquist
screens from Manila but court exhibits suggest it was reports in 2003
of actual screen problems in lee county, Florida that was the tipping
point for management at Bergquist, ES&S and pivot.

Es&s, Bergquist and pivot all realized a major recall of screens
already installed in voting machines was inevitable but how to handle
this public relations nightmare? Court exhibits show ES&S flat out
nervous how could the screens be replaced without attracting the
attention of the press? Executive don conroy of Bergquist recalls
conversations with ES&S management " I think our discussions
immediately went to..

And theirs was...

We asked ES&S about the recalls the company acknowledged there had
been a problem, but says they fixed it by replacing or reworking the
effected screens. And, ES&S says, none of this ever prevented an
accurate vote count. Why? The company's story is that voters would
have noticed if their vote hadn't registered. But how could ES&S be so
sure? It could just be off a quarter of an inch, and this is what
could happen

Even if it is just off a quarter of an inch it could throw a vote
upper or lower to the other candidate and you have the wrong selection
and you really don't realize it touchscreen voting seemed questionable
enough to one official that -while Christine Jennings was still
waiting for the courts to act republican governor Charlie Crist of
Florida early this year reached his own verdict. He moved decisively,
proposing legislation to ban touchscreen machines which don't produce
a paper record of a vote well, I don't want my state to be embarrassed
anymore. As we know, Florida has been a state of note as it relates to
some elections lately, but I think it is important to make sure we are
able to recount an election if we have to. I would rather we didn't
-but if we are going to have to recount, it is nice to have something
to recount - like a paper trail. Republican governor Crist cited the
race of democrat Jennings in his decision to call for change I mean my
goodness, I live in St. Petersburg, that's my home in addition to
Tallahassee now, and Sarasota's very close to where I live, and there
was significant focus on it, and so, you know having the opportunity
when we go forward next year in '08, when that election will occur yet
again, as I now understand it, we'll have the opportunity to verify
the results and make sure that people can have confidence that every
vote is counted, that every vote does count. And what could be more
important in democracy than making sure that this precious act that we
commit, the right to vote, is one that we can have confidence in?

In court Christine Jennings is still trying to get answers out of ES&S
about the Ivotronic machines used in Sarasota--but with little
success. Was there no way to get simple answers? Florida's freedom of
information act is a powerful statute. The act has sometimes been used
to compel companies doing business with the state to turn over
information to the public they don't want to. Governor Crist thinks
the law should apply to voting equipment vendors. If there is a
problem with the machine, obviously accountability should apply. That
is just common sense. We are very proud of our sunshine laws and we
think that the company should be held accountable to the extent that
it doesn't violate their proprietary protection as it relates to trade
secrets of private industry but you know beyond that as much as
humanly possible we think needs to be transparent, needs to be
reviewed needs to be available to the public.

Another voting system is now on the way for parts of Florida - optical
scanners -from various manufacturers-- that simply scan and read paper
ballots where voters have marked their choices. Meanwhile election
supply warehouses statewide, stacked high with expensive touchscreen
machines, suddenly seemed like graveyards here are our touchscreens,
and this is what we use currently until next year and then we are
going to optical scan ballot so this is the past and the present will
be optical scan ballot lee county's new optical scan machines will be
manufactured by ES&S those optical scan units are now being made in
Manila. Workers at the factory there had some concerns about those
machines, too.

ES&S optical scan machines were used in one region of the Philipppines
in a scandal-ridden election in the late nineties. Allegations about
the unreliability of the ES&S optical scan machines and ballot
specifications led to a recount lawsuit that went all the way to the
Philipppine Supreme Court. The result? The Philipppines decided to
return to hand- counted paper ballots -and ES&S fell into disfavor
there, even as the company was starting to produce touchscreen voting
machines in Manila- destined for the United States.

We'll be back with more in a moment, so stay here with us

It all sounds familiar, too familiar. Taxpayers being asked to throw
out millions of dollars worth of voting equipment, start over again,
and pick up the tab. With no guarantee the new equipment will provide
a solution to the problems. Technology can often offer a solution to a
complicated process - in this case, accurately recording votes. But
technology poorly conceived, designed, integrated and tested is a
recipe for failure. In this instance, subsidizing the same outfits
that couldn't get it right the first time, giving them more chances
could lead to the further waste of millions upon millions of taxpayer
dollars. And just as important, the further loss of confidence in our
nation's ability to use technology to provide solutions for
mission-critical applications - none more important to our nation than
accurately recording each of our votes.

Now, back to a core question: was the rush to these expensive and
perhaps ill-conceived new voting systems necessary?

Our investigation took us into the heart of California's central
valley, to the tiny town of Exeter, where for over thirty years
Sequoia voting systems, at this factory, made hundreds of millions of
punch card ballots- up until 2003. . Punch card ballots dominated the
voting landscape in 2000. They were the most common voting system in
Florida. The system seemed idiot- proof. You simply took a stylus and
punched out holes- or chads, as they are known, and the cards were
then run through a computerized tabulator. Couldn't be simpler, or so
it seemed.

What really struck voting experts about the 2000 election in Florida
were the many tens of thousands of ballots that had overvotes or
undervotes for president. Where voters appeared to have voted for more
than one presidential candidate or none at all. Over 50,000 Sequoia
punch cards statewide were discarded as invalid because voters
appeared to have overvoted. In fact, on fully 17,000 of the Sequoia
cards, voters seemed to have voted for three or more presidential
candidates! Meanwhile, in Palm Beach County alone over 10,000 voters
had not voted for president at all.

Experts scrambled for possible explanations- confused voters,
confusing ballot layout- like the infamous butterfly ballot. But no
one was looking at the punch cards themselves.

We recently met up with a group of former Sequoia employees who
actually made the punch card ballots, who feel they have the real
answer as to what happened in Florida 2000- and why.

They have never had a chance to tell their stories. Until now. Thanks
for doing this. I appreciate each and every one of you being here.
Well first of all, tell me who you are and how many years you had at
Sequoia. I'm Tom Ayers and I was at Sequoia for 33 years. I was the
shipping and receiving foreman. I'm Linda Evans I was at Sequoia
pacific for 7 or 8 years and I did quality control. Suzy Keller. I
worked at Sequoia for 25 and a half years and I was the controller.
Giles Jensen. I worked for Sequoia pacific for 25 years and I had
several positions in management. Cy Turner. I was the pressman at
Sequoia for 13 years. Greg Smith. I worked at Sequoia pacific for 32
years and I was a pressman trainer. E. Washington, I was a pressman at
Sequoia pacific. I worked there 26 years. Well have you added up how
many years experience you have cumulative - total between you? A lot.
(laughter)

John Ahmann, the biggest punch card expert in the United States says
that Sequoia pacific made the best voting ballots anywhere. We took
great pride in the quality of ballots we put out-- there was-- no
leeway. It had to be right and it had to be on time. And they took a
great pride in doing that from top to bottom. Well, the company told
customers that Sequoia produced, and I quote, "a no defect product."
now, what did that mean to you? No defect? Punch cards would punch
properly. They would go through the card readers properly. It's a no
fault what they said. And they did it for years. They did it, these
workers say, until the months leading up to the 2000 presidential
election, when they say they saw many things changing, but none more
troubling than the paper itself the paper would come through the press
looking like it was doing-- like jell-o. It would just kinda-- and
we'd have to go throw away both ends of the paper cuz we couldn't run
it. The paper? The paper is a large factor in the quality of the
ballot. It's the flour for the bread. I mean you can't make good bread
without good flour. If you don't have good paper, you won't make good
ballots. Did you have input, you know, as rank and file workers in the
plant, did you have input on what kind of paper was acceptable and
what kind wasn't. Yes.

The policy was workers could reject rolls that were imperfect or
damaged and they often did send rolls out for salvage trying to insure
top-quality ballots. A pressman running a press could reject a roll,
kick it back to raw stock, say this roll was no good. We had rolls
come off in huge logs and they're marked by position when they slice
a, b, c, d, e, right about early 1999 maybe middle of 1999 started
getting rolls marked x and z we couldn't figure that out but man they
were terrible we had quite a bit of input but towards the end we had
no input whatsoever. So things changed. Yes they did. -absolutely
after 1999, it was all over. It was like we were all put on the shelf.
And your opinion didn't after that. Exactly.

What changed in 1999? The paper changed. They decided that they wanted
to go with a certain brand. And I think that everybody's opinion was
this 2000 election was going to be our demise. Because of the poor
quality of what we put out the door. For decades Sequoia had ordered
its punch card ballot paper from James River or International Paper.
The only mills that had traditionally offered voting punch card stock.
In 2000, the company switched to a new mill, Boise Cascade which had
virtually no experience making tab card stock. Workers say they were
told to stop testing paper samples. Traditional quality control
standards were relaxed. There were a lot of things that we were told
to let go. And there was card bins I wouldn't sign off. I refused to
sign em. They'd sit there overnight and they would say, " you gonna
sign em?" and I'd say " no." come in the following morning and all the
bins had been signed off and moved to the front. Which means they're
being made into ballots. Right. Which means someone else signed em off
and said let em go.

But the workers say the problems they were having with the paper went
beyond a mere change in suppliers. They say they were suddenly seeing
paper rolls that weren't clearly even Boise Cascade paper - because
these rolls had Xeroxed Boise shipping labels rather than genuine
ones. Where was all this terrible paper coming from? They say they
were baffled that so much paper could be so bad until one day- they
got a clue. One of the pressman is not here. Bob Krause. He had a
thing if the paper was real bad that he would write little nasty
letters on the side of the roll. Well, we got one of those rolls back
with the same letter that he had written on it. So, then-- that's when
it went through our mind that some of the paper was getting rewound
and sent back. Not only that. Mr. Washington says this roll, and many
of the worst rolls, had a Xeroxed Boise packing label on it. So let me
understand this. Your fellow worker, he gets paper he knows is not up
to quality? Yes. -so he marks on it? Yes. This is bad or whatever.
That presumably leaves the plant or goes somewhere and them it comes
back with one of these Xerox Boise labels on it and labeling? Yeah.
Did you know about this as well? Well, I had the same suspicions as
everybody else did as far as the paper. Felt that it-- it was rejected
and it was taken out of the plant and stored somewhere and then
relabeled and brought back. Well let's just go down the line is there
any doubt in your mind that the company was aware that the ballots for
the 2000 general election were being made with inferior paper? You
don't think there's any doubt that they knew that? No doubt. They were
told every day. Yeah. They were told everyday Sequoia management
insists that all of the paper used to make punch cards ordered for the
presidential election of 2000 came from a single shipment of some half
a million pounds of boise paper delivered directly to the Exeter
plant. But these workers suspect only a fraction of that paper was
actually delivered to the plant- and that the punch cards ordered for
the 2000 presidential election were made from that paper mixed with
defective rolls that they had rejected in years past.

We asked Sequoia to provide a complete set of shipping documents that
would prove its version of events. They didn't provide all the
shipping documents -and what they did give us only raised more
questions for someone who knew the company's business inside out.

Suzy Keller was the former comptroller of Sequoia voting systems. She
had been with the company for over twenty-five years when she left
shortly before the 2000 election. She reviewed all the documents
Sequoia provided. Historically we wouldn't pay for paper without a
signed receiver. There's accounting disciplines that you follow.
Without signed receiving, you didn't pay for it. What we've got here
is the company put forward the documents saying that the documents
prove that all the paper ordered for the 2000 election 550,000 pounds
of this punch card stock was paid for and delivered to the Sequoia
card plant. Now, when you look at the documents, the questions in your
mind are what?

Why didn't somebody sign for the paper? There's no signed-- there is
no one signed that document saying that paper was received at Sequoia.

Was the punch card ballot paper that was supposed to be for the
historic 2000 election- never delivered to the ballot plant? You know,
part of it was-- I'm not gonna say every bit of it. I found, you know,
there was probably about 130,000 pounds that Tom did sign for. But,
the rest of it, there's no-- there's no signatures on the Boise
packing list-- on the roll list. There's nothing. Well, when you read
Sequoia's representation-- here of the documents, as a professional
you say it's complete and accurate? No. Not as an accountant. It is
not complete and accurate, I would not have signed off on that
invoice. And, so-- again, spell it out for me. What's missing? The
signed documentation that the paper was actually received. There has
to be a signature on there, and there is no signature. Did the paper
arrive or not? I can't substantiate that-- there is no signature on
those packing lists.

We also asked Tom Ayers the former head of shipping and receiving to
review the documents Sequoia produced. Ayers was skeptical of them. He
said that he had never stamped invoices as received, the company so
far as he knows, didn't even have such a stamp, all Ayers had ever
done he says was sign and date the receiving invoices we repeatedly
offered Sequoia the opportunity to put any representative on camera to
respond to these former employee's allegations. They instead
communicated through a public relations firm that represented the
documents were complete. Suzy Keller was a financial and accounting
expert.

We also turned to a paper expert, with some of our unanswered
questions Walter Rantanen is perhaps the country's leading forensic
paper analyst. He works with top government agencies including the
secret service and the F.B.I. working at his lab at " integrated paper
services" in Appleton, Wisconsin, Rantanen had a puzzle to solve: Were
the Florida ballots made of Boise Cascade paper stock as Sequoia says?
This is a ballot sample for a fiber analysis Rantanen analyzed the
fibers in the Florida ballots he discovered none of the cards had the
composition of Boise Cascade tab stock which contains soft wood from
the northwest. He also sent Boise Cascade a Florida ballot sample.
Boise confirmed the paper wasn't theirs.

But that wasn't the last surprise about the Florida ballots. There
were not only mysteries about what the cards were made of- but also
the way certain Florida ballots were made. Mr. Washington, you had a
surprising order from your supervisor when you ran ballots for Palm
Beach? We were told to run those cards short because they would grow
by the time they got to Florida in the humidity.

Running short didn't mean the cards were actually shorter. It simply
means lowering -- on the face of the ballot -- the position of the
chads. . So the orders were for the ballots going to Palm Beach, don't
make them meet the-- the normal specifications? Right. Because they
would grow and if met the normal specifications they would grow
outside the specifications because of the humidity. Was this unusual?
Were you surprised by it? Oh yeah, I questioned it, and I even had the
plant manager sign it. Because I was having arguments with quality
control about the size. And so I said, ' The only way I am going to
run it is if Brian comes out here and signs it.' He came out, he
signed the ' okay' card to run em. Let me get this straight. You said,
' You are asking me to turn out a product that doesn't mean our usual
specifications. To be sent specifically to Palm Beach, Florida- Right-
and I'm not doing that unless someone above me signs off. That's
right. So you go to miss quality control and she won't sign off on it.
Nope. She won't ok it. So the plant manager came out and signed the OK
card for us to run em at those specs because that's something that
you're not used to doing. Had this happened to you before? No was
there any other area - did somebody say " Well these ballots are going
to Louisiana Or Texas Or Arizona?" Never according to these workers,
the combination of bad paper and incorrect ballot specifications for
Palm Beach was a recipe for Election Day trouble: a high percentage of
chads that might be misaligned, wouldn't punch correctly.

Chads that could hang, fall out, or get stuck. Any of these events
could cause a ballot to be discounted. Sequoia had a special quality
control machine to test whether those critical problems with chads
might occur on election night.

Linda Evans recalls the chad testing of ballots manufactured for the
2000 election. Chads were falling out. Chads were hanging up. We've
got a machine that it we call a gang punch, which in a sense punches
out all the holes at the same time. You slide the card in there and
you pull down the handle and it punches out all the holes. They
weren't punching out. They were hanging up all over the places. They
were aware of that. Oh, management was aware of it. We told 'em.

Ms. Evans says that management had a simple response to her warnings:
It'll be okay. But it wasn't okay, according to Evans and her
co-workers. They believe that the chad problems at the factory became
chad problems in Florida- causing at the very least thousands of
undervotes, due to hanging or stuck chads. There were over 10,000
undervotes in Palm Beach County.

Evans wonders--did some ten thousand voters really go to the polls
there and decide to skip the race for president in 2000?

We asked Evans if she could demonstrate for us the chad testing that
had led to her concerns. This became possible when last Fall Palm
Beach County released over 200,000 unvoted ballots left over from the
2000 election. We had a gang punch identical to the one used by Linda
Evans at the factory made by an engineer familiar with Sequoia's test
instruments. Rantanen met with Linda Evans at her home in Exeter and
they tested ballots together.

While older Sequoia ballots- made earlier, for another county, punched
perfectly, The Palm Beach ballots made for the 2000 election showed a
troubling pattern: many cards showed clusters of hanging chads-
primarily in the column that contained the presidential candidates.

The pattern was clearer in some precincts than others. It's the
morning after the election in 2000? You turned on the television, you
turned on the radio and you saw and heard about the mess in Florida.
Tell me what you thought. Let's start over with you. What'd you think?
Oh, man. Somebody blew it bad and I bet it was us. Well, I-- I knew it
was us and-- I didn't expect anything less than fiascos. Because you
knew you were dealing with bad paper. Because we were dealing with bad
paper and old tooling. I get a phone call. And it's-- the first one
was from my wife. She goes, "What you guys do?" I go, "What happened?"
she goes, "The ballots are bad in Florida. Palm Beach." so, then, I
hang up and then the next person calls me is my boss Jim Johnson and
he tells me, "We blew it. The ballots are bad in Florida. It's all
over the news and when you got to the plant in the days after the
election, what was the scene there? It was chaotic. They were moving
stuff, hiding stuff, get rid of this. Hiding stuff? Yeah, because the
news people wanted to come in and talk to people and they wanted to
tour the plant.

We were told to get rid of everything, anything that had Florida on it
had to disappear and did it disappear? Yes. Nothing with any kind of
Boise Cascade labels was supposed to be left around. And that word
came from whom? Brian Lehrman. Who was? The plant manager. We
repeatedly invited Sequoia to have Brian Lehrman on camera to answer
some of the workers allegations Sequoia declined what do you think
happened? My own personal opinion was the touch screen voting system
wasn't getting off the ground like that they-- like they would hope.
And because they weren't having any problems with paper ballots. So, I
feel like they-- deliberately did all this to have problems with the
paper ballots so the electronically voting systems would get off the
ground -and which it did in a big way.

It is hard to imagine an event as dramatic as the one in Florida 2000.
And whether Hobson and the workers are right, it is undeniable that in
the months following the 2000 election, Sequoia went from selling
cards for pennies apiece to selling many millions of dollars worth of
touch screen equipment in Florida alone.

The workers have their thoughts, opinions and speculations about this.
You hope for the best in people and you hope it was just some bad
circumstances that came together all in one place. But it should
matter to people and they should check it out, and investigate it more
thoroughly, because if something else was going on, and these people
profited form intentionally screwing up an election, they ought to
pay. They ought to pay hard.

Some of these workers believe that if Sequoia management deliberately
used inferior paper for the punch cards, they crossed a serious line.
I don't think any company should profit from something like this, I
mean, it is almost to the point where it would be illegal. You are
putting out a product that you know isn't going to work to make a
profit. For years they all took pride in the quality of card that they
put out. And this card that went into Florida created a lot of
problems. A lot of problems. Substandard paper, are we trying to force
something here? Are we trying to change the elections community, I
thought those things. I can't substantiate those things but that's
what I thought it was something that-- that really influenced the
direction of this-- this nation. - intentionally or unintentionally.
I'll phrase it that way. But, it-- it-- it's-- a sad state of affairs
that it takes seven years for somebody to actually ask the question to
the people that might have the answer. Agree or disagree, believe what
they say or not. You decide, knowing that Sequoia contends that its
ballots were fine.

These workers are convinced that foreign ownership was part of the
problem at Sequoia. They worry that overseas owners controlled the
production of punch cards and the same will be true of optical scan
ballots -as Sequoia remains a major supplier of ballots nationwide.

What's more important to you: Knowing that your vote is recorded as
you case it or the profits of voting machine manufacturers? It may
seem like an obvious question, but when citizens try to get to the
bottom of how these machines- bought with your taxpayer money- either
work or don't work manufacturers continually hide behind the wall of "
trade secrets." are these machines that determine who decides our
laws, who runs our states, and who sits in the white house with the
power to direct our armed forces no different from the formula for
coca cola, or McDonald's special sauce? We don't think so, and that's
why we tried to get answers tonight. But, unlike Congress or
prosecutors, we aren't armed with subpoena power, we can't force
companies to prove that they take concerns about their machines and
their ballots seriously the message is " trust us," but the
information we have been able to obtain suggests that trust has not
been earned and that voting machines warrant, in fact, much closer
scrutiny than they have received so far. Because, as we heard
Florida's governor Crist ask, " what could be more important in
democracy than making sure that the right to vote is one that we can
have confidence in?"

For HDnet, this is Dan Rather reporting. Good night

--------------------------

Where to Watch - List of Local Stations
http://www.hd.net/watch_at_home.html

You can also watch it in a bar!
http://www.hd.net/sportsbars.html

Shedule (Tonight 8 & 11 ET & it will also air Aug. 15, 17, & 23)
http://www.hd.net/danrather.html#

A Clip is Now Available for Download - Watch the 13 minute Preview Footage
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-1826549866685179676&hl=en

Dan Rather Reports keeps full select episodes online after they've aired:
http://www.hd.net/danrather

You will be able to purchase the DVD of Dan Rather Reports!
http://hdnet-store.stores.yahoo.net/danrare.html

Thank you to Bill Faulkner, Clarity Sanderson, and Joyce McCloy for
helping obtain information for this email.

--
Kathy Dopp

The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author
Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a
Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in
exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at

P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://kathydopp.com
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org

Election Audit Mathematics Bibliography
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/KathyDoppAuditMathBibliography.pdf

Support Clean Elections in 2008
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/SupportCleanElectionsIn2008.pdf

Important Facts About The Voter Confidence & Increased Accessibility Act (HR811)
http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/FactsAboutHR811.pdf

"Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body
and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote
Thomas Jefferson in 1816

Scientists Hack Voting Machines to Prove Tech Weaknesses

2007-07-28T10:26:00.000-07:00

Scientists Hack Voting Machines to Prove Tech Weaknesses Computer scientists from California universities have hacked into three electronic voting systems used in California and elsewhere in the nation and found several ways in which vote totals could potentially be altered, according to reports released yesterday by the state.

National Election Data Archive Supports Election Reform

2007-06-27T18:27:00.001-07:00

But Recommends Changes to Senate Election Reform Proposal

http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/release/ReleaseS1487Amendments.pdf

http://electionmathematics.org/em-legislation/S1487Amendments.pdf

Says Senate Election Reform Proposal Needs Changes to Increase Effectiveness

Salt Lake City, UT; 21 June 2007 -- The National Election Data Archive believes that America is at a crossroads. Kathy Dopp, Executive Director of the National Election Data Archive asks, "Do we move forward with serious voting reforms before November 2008 or leave U.S. voting systems vulnerable to error and fraud?"

The National Election Data Archive is an educational group of mathematicians and statisticians which promotes fair and accurate elections. To strengthen the provisions of proposed election reform legislation, the National Election Data Archive is recommending changes to the "Ballot Integrity Act of 2007" (S1487). The act's purpose is "to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require an individual, durable, voter-verified paper record under title III of such Act, and for other purposes." The act is sponsored by Senator Dianne Feinstein and its co-sponsors include three presidential candidates, Senators Clinton, Dodd, and Obama. It is currently being considered by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.

The National Election Data Archive issued "21 Amendment Suggestions for the 'Ballot Integrity Act of 2007' (S1487)" plus an analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of election audit proposals to detect error or fraud in US House and Senate races. "21 Amendment Suggestions" recommends improvements to the election audit provisions of the "Ballot Integrity Act" (S1487) and urges public oversight and procedures that are necessary to verify the accuracy of election results. The National Election Data Archive also advocates removing unfunded mandates; reducing secrecy in the vote counting process and other changes to reduce the vulnerability of the electoral process to electronic error, failure, and hacking; while retaining states' rights to determine voting system standards.

Dopp explained why election reform legislation is urgently needed: "Federal election outcomes determine who controls budgets worth trillions of dollars and affect lives worldwide. There is a temptation to manipulate votes since winning is so valuable; and our mathematical analysis of election data suggests wide-spread vote fraud has occurred." Dopp proclaims "There are dozens of ways for undetected electronic vote count error to alter election outcomes and an absence of independent checks (audits) of vote count accuracy. Only one state currently performs independent audits of vote count accuracy for federal elections." She added, "We independently audit banks to make sure they are counting our money correctly. Shouldn't we be as careful with our votes?"

The "21 Amendment Suggestions for the Senate Ballot Integrity Act of 2007" is found at:
http://electionmathematics.org/em-legislation/S1487Amendments.pdf

And "Comparison of Proposed Federal Election Audits" is found at:
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/ComparisonFederalElectionAuditProposals.pdf

The National Election Data Archive supports the election reform legislation proposed by Representative Rush Holt, D-NJ in the House, the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act" (HR811) which has 215 bi-partisan co-sponsors. However the organization is withholding support for the Senate version and recommending improvements.

The House version of election reform legislation, HR811, requires more substantial election audits, from 3%, to 10% in close races, whereas the Senate version requires a flat 2% audit. By analyzing election results from the 2002 and 2004 US House and Senate races, Dopp found that a 99% success-rate audit would better protect all federal races from vote fraud and yet require manual audits of fewer precincts overall than the House or Senate audit versions. According to Dopp's analysis HR811's audit would not have protected 4 and 8 U.S. House races from possible outcome-changing vote fraud in 2004 and 2002 respectively. On the other hand, S1487 requires an internal audit conducted by election officials of their own work and its 2% amounts would not have protected 4 US House races and 1 South Dakota Senate race in 2004, and 13 House races and 1 New Hampshire Senate race in 2002 from possible outcome-changing vote fraud.

Many groups in addition to the National Election Data Archive support the House version of election reform (HR811) including People For the American Way, Common Cause, Move On, The Service Employees International Union, The National Education Association, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Brennan Justice Center, The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Vote Trust USA, Verified Voting Americans United for Democracy, Integrity, and Transparency (AUDIT) - Arizona, True Vote Maryland, Georgians for Verified Voting, Presidential Candidate Governor Bill Richardson, and prominent voting technology experts Avi Rubin of John Hopkins University Department of Computer Science, Doug Kellner, Co-Chair New York State Board of Elections, and Ed Felten of Princeton University Department of Computer Science.

About the National Election Data Archive:

The National Election Data Archive is a 501(c)(3) non-profit Utah Corporation, USCountVotes. The National Election Data Archive has been organized for educational and scientific purposes of promoting fair and accurate elections by promoting public access to election records and data; and developing technology and mathematical methods to detect any voter disenfranchisement or vote count inaccuracy. Such methods include independent manual vote count audits, exit poll discrepancy analysis, and the public release and scientific analysis of election data along with public release of election records necessary to verify the integrity of the data.

The National Election Data Archive believes that sufficient, timely, verifiable, independent election audits and public access to election records and detailed data are necessary to detect voter disenfranchisement and to evaluate the integrity and accuracy of the electoral process and election outcomes.

Press Contact:
Kathy Dopp, Executive Director, National Election Data Archive, kathy@electionarchive.org
435.658.4657 (office)
(nuked the mobile # by blogmaster)

Additional Information:

The Ballot Integrity Act of 2007
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:s.01487 :

A reliable, verifiable vote in 2008, Governor Bill Richardson
http://thehill.com/op-eds/a-reliable-verifiable-vote-in-2008-2007-06-19.html

HR 811: Separating Truth from Fiction in E-voting Reform, Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 13, 2007
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/005308.php#005308

The Campaign for Secure Elections (HR811), Lawrence Norden, June 13, 2007
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-norden/the-campaign-for-secure-e_b_51986.html

The "Ballot Integrity Act" Sponsor is Feinstein, Dianne, D-CA,
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContactUs.Home

Co-sponsors

Boxer, Barbara D-CA, http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContactUs.Home

Brown, Sherrod, D-OH, http://brown.senate.gov/contact.cfm

Clinton, Hillary Rodham D-NY, http://clinton.senate.gov/contact/

Dodd, Christopher J. D-CT, http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3130

Inouye, Daniel K. D-HI, http://inouye.senate.gov/

Kennedy, Edward M. D-MA, http://kennedy.senate.gov/senator/contact.cfm

Leahy, Patrick J. D-VT, http://leahy.senate.gov/ senator_leahy@leahy.senate.gov

Menendez, Robert D-NJ, http://menendez.senate.gov/contact/contact.cfm

Obama, Barack D-IL, http://obama.senate.gov/contact/

Sanders, Bernard, I-VT, http://sanders.senate.gov/comments/

Senate Rules Committee Members who could make the recommended amendments while the S1487 is being considered in committee

Robert C. Byrd, D-WV, http://byrd.senate.gov/byrd_email.html

Daniel K. Inouye, D-HI, 202-224-3934 or http://inouye.senate.gov/

Christopher J. Dodd, D-CT, http://dodd.senate.gov/

Charles E. Schumer, D-NY, http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/contact/contact.html

Richard J. Durbin, D-IL, http://durbin.senate.gov/contact.cfm

E. Benjamin Nelson, D-NE, http://bennelson.senate.gov/contact/index.cfm

Harry Reid, D-NV, http://reid.senate.gov/contact/

Patty Murray, D-WA, http://murray.senate.gov/contact/

Mark L. Pryor, D-AR, http://pryor.senate.gov/contact/

Ted Stevens, R-AK, http://stevens.senate.gov/public/

Mitch McConnell, R-KY, http://mcconnell.senate.gov/contact.cfm

Thad Cochran, R-MS, http://cochran.senate.gov/contact.htm

Trent Lott, R-MS, http://lott.senate.gov/public/

Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-TX, http://hutchison.senate.gov/contact.html

C. Saxby Chambliss, R- GA, http://chambliss.senate.gov/public/index.cfm

Chuck Hagel, R-NE, http://hagel.senate.gov/

Lamar Alexander, R-TN, http://alexander.senate.gov/

Action Items
As a 501(c)(3) the National Election Data Archive may spend a limited fraction of its income on efforts to lobby for election reform legislation. Therefore, we will be depending on you, the voters, to take action such as:

1. Please call your Senators' legislative staffers who handle election reform legislation and mail, email, or fax copies of "21 Suggested Amendments" to their legislative staffers who handle election reform legislation, hopefully after speaking with them; or

2. Travel to Washington DC to speak with your Senators and with the Senators on the Rules Committee.

--
Kathy Dopp

The material expressed herein is the informed product of the author Kathy Dopp's fact-finding and investigative efforts. Dopp is a Mathematician, Expert in election audit mathematics and procedures; in exit poll discrepancy analysis; and can be reached at

P.O. Box 680192
Park City, UT 84068
phone 435-658-4657

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://kathydopp.com
http://electionmathematics.org
http://electionarchive.org

Election Audit Mathematics Bibliography
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/KathyDoppAuditMathBibliography.pdf

Support Clean Elections in 2008
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/SupportCleanElectionsIn2008.pdf

Important Facts About The Voter Confidence & Increased Accessibility Act (HR811)
http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/FactsAboutHR811.pdf

"Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1816

Stop voter suppression, Hans von Spakovsky, to FEC

2007-06-26T09:49:00.000-07:00

From Steve Silverman:

I just learned from ColorOfChange that President Bush has nominated Hans von Spakovsky--one of the worst perpetrators of voter suppression in recent history--to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), an agency charged with enforcing election law. Under Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, von Spakovsky led the effort within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to win elections for Republicans by disenfranchising minority voters.

It's important that members of the Senate take a stand for voting rights by refusing to confirm von Spakovsky. Can you take a moment to send a brief message to your senators?

http://www.colorofchange.org/vonspakovsky/?id=2233-148956

Congressional investigations into the actions of Alberto Gonzales and the firings at the Justice Department have pointed to an even bigger scandal: that for years, the Republican party has been suppressing the vote of minority and low income voters---those most likely to vote Democratic. And Hans von Spakovsky has been at the center of the suppression strategy.

During his first term, Bush installed von Spakovsky in the Justice Department's voting rights section, which enforces the Voting Rights Act. There, von Spakovsky undermined the DOJ's historic mission of protecting minority voting rights, and actually transformed the department into a tool to suppress the vote.

When long-term, career employees at the Justice Department unanimously recommended rejecting Tom Delay's infamous Texas redistricting plan because it discriminated against minority voters, von Spakovsky led the charge to overrule these voting rights experts, and approved the plan. The Supreme Court later ruled that the plan violated the Voting Rights Act.

Similarly, when career attorneys recommended rejecting a discriminatory Georgia voter ID law -- a law that even the Republican Governor said would disenfranchise hundreds of thousands of Georgians -- von Spakovsky overruled them to approve the law. Again, the law was later struck down by the courts, with the ruling judge likening it to a Jim Crow-era poll tax.

Last week, seven of von Spakovsky's former colleagues at the DOJ said that he blocked career attorneys from filing at least three lawsuits against local governments that had violated the voting rights of Black people and other minorities, and that he derailed at least two DOJ investigations into discriminatory election laws.

Von Spakovsky's career in suppression didn't start at the DOJ. In 1997, he set the stage for Florida's 2000 voter purge when he wrote an article that called for purging felons from voter rolls. Serving on the board of the "Voter Integrity Project" (VIP) he quickly put his ideas into action -- VIP met with the company that designed Florida's purge to disenfranchise thousands of eligible voters, most of whom were Black.

As shocking as these examples are, they only scratch the surface. Hans von Spakovsky has made it his life mission to solidify Republican control by disenfranchising untold thousands and subverting our most fundamental democratic right.

A vote for von Spakovsky is a vote for voter suppression. Anything less than the strongest condemnation of his nomination will send a message to President Bush that the Senate will turn a blind eye to Republican attacks on our voting rights. Let's demand that our senators send the opposite message -- that they will fight tooth and nail to defend the right to vote, and that their strong rejection of von Spakovsky's nomination is only the beginning of a much needed reckoning for the assault on voting rights over the last six and a half years.

You can help make sure your senators do the right thing and oppose von Spakovsky's nomination. It takes only a moment.

http://www.colorofchange.org/vonspakovsky/?id=2233-148956

Bill Richardson gets it in terms of voting process

2007-06-19T19:12:00.000-07:00

Article in "The Hill", is by Governor Bill Richardson, Candidate for U.S. President.

Richardson is from the only state in America which currently conducts independent audits of vote count accuracy, New Mexico. Richardson is a long-time proponent of paper ballots for all voting systems. He even wrote all 50 states to urge them to use paper ballots for elections.

http://utahcountvotes.org/US/GovRichardsonLtr20060301.pdf

Pondering (HR811)

2007-06-13T15:44:00.000-07:00

Proposed federal election reform legislation (HR811) from Lawrence Norden of NYU Law School Brennan Center Think Tank and from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both debunk some of the disinformation which has been unfortunately
ubiquitously been spread on the Internet by opponents of HR811.

1.
HR 811: Separating Truth From Fiction in E-voting Reform June 13, 2007
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/005308.php#005308

[Comments by David Dill re. the EFF article: This is generally a good
essay, but the legal analysis, especially on NDA , deserves special
attention. EFF is run by world class intellectual property lawyers,
and has been involved in providing legal backup on NDAs for various
source-code reviews. They know trade secret law. This article should
put to rest the arguments that HR 811 somehow creates new trade
secrets or otherwise makes voting machine software less accessible (of
course, I know those claims will continue to be repeated incessantly
as though they were established fact, but I hope that some of the
people who see them will also see the EFF post).]

HR 811: Separating Truth From Fiction in E-voting Reform
June 13, 2007

After years of painstaking lobbying, e-mail and phone campaigns,
congressional hearings, and committee markups and amendments, Rep.
Rush Holt's Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act finally
appears poised for a floor vote in the House of Representatives. With
an impressive 216 bipartisan co-sponsors, the bill has a real chance
of passing. If signed into law, HR 811 would dramatically improve the
electoral process in both the short and long term. While it would not
solve the immense shortcomings in the current system, HR 811 would
take a giant step towards returning much-needed transparency and
accountability to the process.

Not unexpectedly, now that the bill has gained traction in the 110th
Congress, critics have descended onto the bill with a fury,
complaining that it is too weak or too strong, that its deadlines are
too ambitious or too distant, that it takes too much autonomy away
from the states or not enough.

HR 811 is not perfect. Few bills are. And honest debate about a matter
as important as election integrity is always helpful to the process.
However, much of the ostensibly pro-transparency criticism of HR 811
has sadly taken a detour away from being useful and descended into
hyperbole, fear-mongering, and uninformed posturing. Returning to the
substance of the bill and its actual consequences is long overdue.

What would HR 811 do? Among other things:

* Raise the floor, not a create a ceiling. The higher standards
required by HR 811 would provide the beginning, not the end, of
serious election reform. States wishing to, say, ban all electronic
voting machines, impose stricter audit requirements, or force vendors
to publicly disclose all of their source code will remain free to do
so, as they are today. If HR 811 becomes law, however, states would
not be permitted to lag behind in many important areas as so many do
today.

* Require the generation of a voter-verified paper ballot. HR 811
would forbid in federal elections the use of direct recording
electronic voting machines (DREs) that do not generate voter-verified
paper ballots (VVPBs). See proposed Sec. 301(a)(2)(A)(i): "The voting
system shall require the use of or produce an individual, durable,
voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created
by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter
before the voter's vote is cast and counted." States wishing to impose
additional requirements regarding what to do with VVPBs, such as a
mandatory hand-count of all paper ballots, would be able to do so.

* Require manual audits of every federal election. HR 811 would not
mandate (or forbid) the counting of VVPBs in all circumstances.
Instead, HR 811 would require, for the first time in American history,
across-the-board manual audits of federal elections. See proposed Sec.
321(a)(1): "[E]ach State shall administer, without advance notice to
the precincts selected, audits of the results of elections for Federal
office held in the State (and, at the option of the State or
jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at
the same time as such election) consisting of random hand counts of
the voter-verified paper ballots ..." Specifically, HR 811 would
require audits of 3-10% of all precincts in every federal election
(see proposed Sec. 322), depending on the apparent margin of victory
and except in the case of landslide victories. This would be a
breathtaking and unprecedented achievement. By contrast, federal law
currently contains no audit requirement at all. States believing that
initialhand counts or more robust audit protocols are more appropriate
for their voters would have every right to impose such requirements.

* Require the disclosure of voting system source code in limited
circumstances. HR 811 would, for the first time under federal law,
explicitly mandate the disclosure of voting system source code to
certain "qualified persons," identified as (among others) parties to
litigation and individuals who "review[], analyze[], or report[] on
the technology solely for an academic, scientific, technological, or
other investigation or inquiry concerning the accuracy or integrity of
the technology." See proposed Sec. 301(a)(8)(C). Individuals seeking
such access would, in some circumstances, be required to sign a
non-disclosure agreement. Just as now, however, individuals who
lawfully acquire voting system source code independent of the
(non-exclusive) procedures set forth by HR 811 (see, for example, Avi
Rubin's groundbreaking analysis of Diebold source code that was leaked
onto the Internet) would be free to analyze the code accordingly.
States wanting even greater transparency could mandate broader
disclosure requirements (see proposed Sec. 301(a)(8)(B)(ii)(II)),
including disposing of any non-disclosure requirement or even
mandating the use of open source software. Moreover, vendors
themselves could dispense with the non-disclosure agreement
requirement, either by explicitly granting permission to share
otherwise secret source code or by utilizing open source systems.

What would HR 811 not do? The misconceptions and misrepresentations
are, unfortunately, widespread.

* "HR 811 doesn't ban all DREs." True, but misleading. DREs, paperless
or otherwise, are already permitted under federal law. HR 811 would
ban the use of paperless DREs in federal elections unless they are
retrofitted with printers that generate voter-verifiable paper
ballots. An outright ban on DREs may or may not be possible with this
Congress, but it is irrelevant to whether or not this bill should
pass. Rep. Holt's strategy -- to convince Congress of the need to
improve transparency in U.S. elections, regardless of technology -- is
a sound one, one that many volunteers have expended extraordinary
efforts to bring to fruition and one that could be on the verge of
succeeding. Nothing has prevented or currently prevents now-vocal
critics who are calling for an outright DRE ban from going through the
process of drafting the appropriate legislative proposal and then
soliciting the necessary support for it. But attempting to derail or
hijack HR 811 as a vehicle to ram through an unlikely-to-pass DRE ban
unnecessarily risks the passage of other important substantive
requirements. And once again, nothing in HR 811 prohibits states from
limiting the use of DREs of any kind or banning them altogether.

* "HR 811 reinforces secret vote counting." False. On the contrary, HR
811, if passed, would begin to open up the process. Federal law
already permits the use of paperless DREs. Only 27 states currently
require the use of voter-verified paper ballots (or voter-verified
audit trails), and only 13 of those require audits. The lack of robust
federal requirements, and the failure of straggler states to implement
restrictions of their own, has led to the widespread use of suspect
voting equipment like DREs. If enacted, HR 811 would, for the first
time, place real restrictions on the use of electronic voting
equipment. Again, if states think that HR 811's requirements aren't
robust enough, they can pass legislation of their own.

* "HR 811 prohibits the disclosure of voting system software." False.
HR 811 would for the first time federally mandate the disclosure of
election-specific source code. The disclosure provision that emerged
from committee is certainly not as broad as it could be. Public
disclosure is not required, as the original language of HR 811
demanded. Yet as discussed above, HR 811 would explicitly protect the
right of access for certain reviewers who currently have no such such
guaranteed right and who have been routinely denied access to any
software in some of the many battles that EFF has fought in the courts
and elsewhere since 2003. The software industry fought long and hard
behind the scenes to scuttle any disclosure requirement. That the
current disclosure language emerged from committee at all is a
testament to the many individuals, organizations, and lawmakers
dedicated to election integrity who stood up in support of the bill
instead of trying to tear it down. Make no mistake: this disclosure
requirement is simply one of many initial steps in a long struggle
towards full transparency of elections. But it is a critically
important step, nonetheless. And once again, states may mandate any
kind of additional disclosure, including an open source requirement,
that they wish.

* "HR 811 makes voting system source code a trade secret." False, and
demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of trade secrecy law. HR 811
does not, in any way, "create" trade secrets or transform voting
system source code into a trade secret. Information either meets trade
secret criteria -- created by each individual state, and not the
federal government -- or it doesn't. As EFF and others have repeatedly
experienced, the lack of guaranteed access to this code due to trade
secrecy claims has been a major impediment to litigation over voting
system failures, like the ongoing litigation brought by voters in
Sarasota County, Florida, for which EFF serves as co-counsel. Far from
"creating" trade secrets, HR 811 actually limits the protections
offered by state trade secrecy laws to voting system source code. For
example, the bill identifies "trade secrets" as one of the categories
of information, protected in some circumstances by a mandatory
non-disclosure agreement, that must be disclosed to qualified
individuals who would have the newly-created right to review the
software. Absent HR 811, litigants (such as those involved in the
ongoing Sarasota County litigation) and computer science experts
interesting in testing system integrity would have no guarantee of
obtaining access to the source code at all. Individuals who do not
enter into the non-disclosure agreements discussed in HR 811 would not
be affected, and efforts to obtain access to code by other means would
proceed as they always have. Critics may desire greater access to this
code, as would EFF, but assertions that the bill would somehow "make
the source code a government-recognized trade secret" are
disingenuous. And here too, states can decide to step in and limit or
even rescind the protections offered by their own trade secrecy laws.

* "Source code reviewers could be sued if they make false claims about
source code obtained via the disclosure requirements of HR 811." True,
but misleading. Individuals who make damaging false claims about any
product, voting system-related or otherwise, subject themselves to
potential liability but also enjoy the protections of the First
Amendment which generally allows for honestly mistaken claims but does
not protect malicious intentional lying. HR 811 would not, and should
not, protect individuals who knowingly lie. On the other hand, HR 811
would explicitly permit code reviewers to publicly report their
findings: the NDA signed by code reviewers must "allow[] the signatory
to perform analyses on the technology (including by executing the
technology), disclose reports and analyses that describe operational
issues pertaining to the technology (including vulnerabilities to
tampering, errors, risks associated with use, failures as a result of
use, and other problems), and describe or explain why or how a voting
system failed or otherwise did not perform as intended." See proposed
Sec. 301(a)(8)(D)(viii). HR 811 wouldn't change the First Amendment,
nor could it. But the First Amendment doesn't ordinarily protect
knowing misrepresentations and neither would HR 811.

* "Experts who sign NDAs will be prohibited from reviewing other
voting technology in the future." False. HR 811 would specifically
require otherwise: a legal NDA "does not prohibit a signatory from
entering into other nondisclosure agreements to review other
technologies under this paragraph ..." See proposed Sec.
301(a)(8)(D)(ii).

I could, unfortunately, go on.

Attempts by certain vendors and election officials to derail
meaningful reform that would implicate their existing technology, or
underscore the potentially high cost of replacing it, are
understandable and expected. However, advocates of more open and
transparent elections do themselves and the voters of this country a
disservice by attempting to undermine, with claims about the bill that
are plainly wrong, the passage of important legislation that would
make real and important gains.

EFF strongly supports the passage of HR 811 and hopes that you will as
well. Don't just take my word for it: read the bill for yourself and
then make your own decision. If you don't think that HR 811 goes far
enough, then push for passage of complementary legislation, either in
Congress or with your own state legislatures. EFF will continue to
support sensible legislative proposals that can build on the
foundation of HR 811. But whatever you do, don't fall for the false
choice offered in the breathless rhetoric of the "all or nothing"
contingent. Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. And HR 811
is good.

2.
The Campaign for Secure Elections June 13, 2007
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-norden/the-campaign-for-secure-e_b_51986.html

Lawrence Norden, counsel in the Brennan Center for Justice Democracy
Program and was the Chair of the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting
System Security, writes in support of passing Rush Holt's bill.

Please read the legislation yourself if you have any questions about it.
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h811rh.txt.pdf

As the presidential candidates' ramp up their campaigns, it's hard to
resist asking, 'can't give us a break?' Didn't the last federal
election cycle just end? Isn't November 2008 awfully far away?

Perhaps. But there is one campaign for all future federal elections
that must begin in earnest immediately. And that is the campaign to
make elections as secure and accurate as possible. After Florida's
hanging chad debacle in 2000, voting irregularities in Ohio in 2004,
and the mysterious loss of 18,000 votes in a House race in Sarasota in
2006, there is little room for another divisive national election
marred by voting machine glitches.

The good news is that experts agree on what steps must be taken to
make voting systems more secure and more reliable. In fact, the House
of Representatives is about to vote on a bill introduced by
Congressmen Rush Holt (D-NJ) and Tom Davis (R-VA) that would mandate
many of these steps.

Most dramatically, the Holt-Davis bill would ban all paperless
electronic voting in federal elections. By November 2008, all states
would have to use voting systems that produce a voter verifiable paper
record. In other words, voters would vote on systems that give them an
opportunity to review or fill out a piece of paper that contains a
record of their votes. Currently, voters in 18 states are denied that
opportunity.

Just as importantly, Holt-Davis mandates random manual counts
comparing the voter verified paper to the electronic tallies, in order
to "check" the electronic count and ensure that programming errors,
software bugs or other corrupt software did not cause the electronic
voting machine to miscount federal election results. Only 13 states
require this important security measure today.

The bill also bans the use of most wireless components on voting
machines. Security experts have warned that wireless components can be
particularly dangerous, because they can allow a member of the general
public to send or receive signals from the voting machines from a
distance -- potentially triggering attacks against the voting systems
with a hand held device such as a Palm Pilot or other personal digital
assistant. Only two states ban such components for all machines.

Finally, the bill would immediately end the practice whereby vendors
pay and choose the testing labs that certify their machines. Voting
integrity experts have long decried this system, which creates a
serious conflict of interest for testing lab: pass a system or risk
the loss of future business? Not surprisingly, this system has
produced terrible results. The testing labs have certified many
machines that had serious security defects, violated federal
guidelines, and broke down on Election Day, losing thousands of votes.
Under Rep. Holt's bill, the Election Assistance Commission will hold
money for testing labs in escrow, and assign testing labs for machine
certification at random.

None of these proposed changes should be controversial. Nevertheless,
opposition to the bill has built in recent weeks.

Many election officials have complained that the bill's deadlines are
unrealistic. They also fear that they may not receive adequate funding
to make the needed changes. Fortunately, the most recent version of
the Holt-Davis bill moves many of the deadlines to more realistic time
frames (while still mandating an end to paperless electronic voting by
November 2008). It also significantly increases federal funds to local
jurisdictions to make equipment changes. Ultimately, the objections of
some election officials are not reasons to oppose this critical bill.
If need be, deadlines can be adjusted as the legislation moves
forward, and appropriators can be held accountable if they fail to
provide sufficient funds to get the job done.

Some have used these objections as an excuse to make sure Congress
does not do anything to make voting systems more secure and accurate.
Last week, Congressman Vernon Ehlers (R-MI) introduced the so-called
"Voter Enhancement and Security Act of 2007," urging his fellow
Republicans to vote for it instead of the bipartisan Holt-Davis bill.
Unfortunately, Congressman Ehlers' bill does nothing to address the
serious voting system security vulnerabilities experts have
identified.

We cannot allow election integrity and security to become a partisan
issue addressed with public relations messages instead of honest
analysis of the risks and serious implementation of the solutions.
Congress has an opportunity to act now. Voting system fiascos in each
of the last several federal elections suggest that if it fails to do
so, we will see more divisive Election Day debacles -- all too soon.

Lawrence Norden is the author of the just published The Machinery of
Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World (Academy
Chicago Press). He is a counsel in the Brennan Center for Justice
Democracy Program and was the Chair of the Brennan Center Task Force
on Voting System Security.

E-Voting Threatens Election Integrity — AMERICAN.COM: A Magazine of Ideas, Online

2007-06-03T15:57:00.000-07:00

E-Voting Threatens Election Integrity — AMERICAN.COM: A Magazine of Ideas, Online

Notes from a local friend follow:

This is a good piece. I think it characterizes H.R. 811 very well.

It would be useful for people to drop a line to their congresscritters in support of H.R. 811 (for House members) and "similar legislation" (for our Senators).

Please feel free to forward this on to the state list.

Dave Eckhardt

Golden Girls among a cadre of aging part-time government workers

2007-05-19T00:36:00.000-07:00

Golden Girls among a cadre of aging part-time government workers The wheels of democracy come to a halt every day, around midmorning, when the Golden Girls take their banana break.

GOP write-ins may take 2 weeks to tally

2007-05-17T02:30:00.000-07:00

GOP write-ins may take 2 weeks to tally: "Unofficial results released to news media on election night showed results with 100 percent of precincts reporting, but the numbers continued to change slightly throughout the day yesterday. In at least one race, the winners also changed."

Ward Cunningham - Wiki and the rise of gift economies

2007-05-13T01:44:00.000-07:00

re-public: re.imagining democracyRe-public : re-imagining democracy - english version � Ward Cunningham - Wiki and the rise of gift economies To succeed in the long term, an open source project must be transparent and permeable as well as open. Permeable means that others can introduce improvements. One’s psychology resists that. Extreme programming avoids this unwanted possessiveness by jointly owning code from the beginning. When I can take pride in your accomplishments I’m most of the way there.

Ron Paul Grassroots Information Hub | Grassroots Activities Blog

2007-05-12T23:08:00.000-07:00

Ron Paul Grassroots Information Hub | Grassroots Activities Blog: "Pajamas Media needs to understand that their straw poll app is too easily manipulated and that it’s very easy for Ron Paul detractors to vote on his behalf, and that calling out Paul and supporters without evidence is wrong. Their poll relies solely on cookies, which is easily circumvented, and they have spent more time accusing Paul supporters of cheating than they would have if they just fixed their poll (more on this below.) Pajamas Media has presented no evidence that actual Paul supporters are spamming the votes, and they are in fact providing incentives to detractors in the way they are handling the situation. Think about how easy it would be for someone to get Pajamas Media to discredit Paul, or any candidate, by spamming their poll on their behalf? I could go vote 1000 times for Duncan Hunter, and PJM would assume, falsely, that a Hunter supporter was to blame."

Computer foul-up mires CMU student elections

2007-05-12T21:29:00.000-07:00

Be careful punching ballots, if you can't find the hole.

Computer foul-up mires CMU student elections The good news about Carnegie Mellon University's student government election this year is that voter turnout was up.

The bad news is that how those people voted may never be known.

All 1,933 ballots were rendered irretrievable by a computer foul-up that -- depending on you viewpoint -- illustrates the perils of electronic balloting or simply shows that technology can bedevil people, even on one of the nation's most tech-savy college campuses.

Hacked, hacked off, and -- worse yet -- hacked out

2007-05-02T10:28:00.000-07:00

http://rudd-o.com/archives/2007/04/30/spread-this-number

Spread this number

09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0.

Wanna know what's so important about it?

From the Community Commons mailing lists: http://lists.ibiblio.org/mailman/listinfo/cc-community

More interesting tidbits on the whole HD-DVD processing code debate:

Original Story that started it all:
http://rudd-o.com/archives/2007/04/30/spread-this-number/

Details on how people are getting banned (Including CJ and Myself):
http://www.cjmillisock.com/2007/05/how-i-got-banned-from-digg.html

Doom9 Post (A very good read):
http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?s=cd2862cdc65d3c44e0efc857e4f0f7bf&t=121866

Signature: Removed from DeviantArt - "z00kus" account banned! - Was added to gallery though for download!

A song was made: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9HaNbsIfp0

Techno Version: http://www.esnips.com/doc/7d70f3c1-59d7-429d-9058-0cd5b10ad446/09-F9-11-02-9D-74-E3-5B-D8-41-56-C5-63-56-88-C0

MD5 Was made (Why not?): d1af2e56517a7202a1cc087a69c4e296

Random Sites:

http://www.09-f9-11-02-9d-74-e3-5b-d8-41-56-c5-63-56-88-c0.net/

http://09-f9-11-02-9d-74-e3-5b-d8-41-56-c5-63.com/

http://09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0.com/

http://www.hddvdkey.com

Slashdot’s Article(s):
http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/07/05/02/0235228.shtml

http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/05/01/1935250&from=rss

InfoWorld News Article:
http://weblog.infoworld.com/railsback/archives/2007/05/digg_losing_con.html

Gerald Stuhrberg’s Homage:
http://undeadmonkey.com/apache2-default/

Nicholas Pan's Homage:
http://pen15.info/

Wikipedia (On banning with the HD-DVD Key):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Zscout370#HD_DVD_Key

Nice critical overview of the debate from the ever-illuminating Technollama

http://technollama.blogspot.com/2007/05/hd-dvd-brought-down-by-web-20.html

Dustin Montgomery's log of Events (As seen by him):
http://en3r0.blogspot.com/2007/05/may-1st-digg-revolt.html

From (where else) the Facebook group 09-F9-11-02-9D-74-E3-5B-D8-41-56-C5-63-56-88-C0

http://swan.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2338184677

Bulgarians are already aware. Are you?

http://yovko.net/?p=1120
http://borj.org/blog/2007/05/09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688.html
http://www.tonev.net/2007/05/02/09f911029d74e35bd84156c5635688c0/
http://spisanie.cc/nb/?p=559
http://luchko.wordpress.com/2007/05/02/09-f9-11-02-9d-74-e3-5b-d8-41-56-c5-63-56-88-c0/

who wants to watch the election tabulation?

2007-05-01T12:13:00.000-07:00

Because we (Libertarians) are not on the primary election ballot, we don't have standing to observe the tabulation on election night.

But Dr. Richard King of PA Verified Voting appears to have talked the Republicans into lending out an observer slot or two... if we can quickly name a volunteer there's a good chance we can get in, which will provide us with a dry-run for November.

Last time VoteAllegheny sent two representatives under the auspices of the Constitution and Green parties; their report is available here:
http://www.voteallegheny.org/tabrep120406.pdf

Due to my other involvement in the election process, I won't be available. Due to the over-computerized nature of the proceedings, somebody with computer experience might be best, but the truth is that the process should be designed so that any citizen can understand and meaningfully oversee it, so any participant is probably better than none.

Dave Eckhardt

The Fraudulence of Voter Fraud

2007-04-18T18:11:00.000-07:00

"When Rove talks about protecting 'ballot integrity,' that is shorthand for disenfranchising Democratic Party voters. When Republicans talk about voter fraud, they are referring to illegal voting by individuals, as opposed to vote fraud - systematic attempts to steal an election by an organized group of partisans. This emphasis on voter fraud has convinced eight states to pass laws requiring voters to present official photo identification in order to cast a ballot - laws that studies have shown suppress Democratic turnout among voters who are poor, black, Latino, Asian-American or disabled," says Joel Bleifuss.

RELEASE: Election Reform Groups Formally Oppose Public Disclosure of All Voting System Software.

2007-04-07T19:34:00.000-07:00

Black Box Voting, Voters Unite, Democracy For New Hampshire and Others - Advocating For Vendors Or Voters?

Saturday, April 07, 2007

CONTACT: Kathy Dopp, kathy.dopp@gmail.com

To quote Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com:

"If I find someone working *against* EI [election integrity], whether on purpose, or accidentally, or out of fear or anything else, I will call them on it, since such behavior impedes the process towards American EI."

FACT 1: Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software is more expensive, less secure and less reliable than publicly disclosed software and open source (free publicly disclosed) software.

FACT 2: COTS software is trade secret.

FACT 3: There is no legal means to require public disclosure of all COTS software on voting systems.

FACT 4: There is no technical means to ensure that COTS software does not contain any malicious or buggy programs that would deny voting rights or manipulate vote counts.

FACT 5: There is no practical method, given today's voting machine development methods and designs, to ensure that any voting system software actually ran on a voting machine during an election.

FACT 6: There is no infrastructure (equipment, systems, and technologists) available to verify that any voting system software actually ran on a voting machine during an election. (This infrastructure could be developed over time but could only be effective if more secure publicly disclosed voting machines were implemented with this goal in mind.)

FACT 7: Any COTS voting system software could be used to rig elections or to deny service to voters. COTS software is manufactured in China, Canada, India, and many other countries from which hacking attacks against US military and government computers have already occurred. Trusting COTS software is trusting tens of thousands of employees in thousands of companies all over America and the world.

FACT 8: The vast majority of software on current electronic voting systems (DREs, optical scanners, ballot marking devices, and central tabulating devices) is COTS software.

FACT 9: There is no need to use any COTS software on voting systems. Voting systems without COTS software could be developed and would be less costly, more secure, more reliable, and more verifiable.

FACT 10: There are no voting systems available today without COTS software, but fully publicly disclosed and open source voting systems could be developed and implemented especially if the government provided incentives or stopped spending taxpayer dollars on trade secret COTS voting systems.

Are voting system vendors or Common Cause or People for the American Way (PFAW), who pushed for paperless electronic voting in 2002, pushing for trade secret voting system software? Not publicly.

It is "Election integrity" groups and their followers who are demanding changes to proposed federal legislation which would otherwise require public disclosure of all software; in order to enable the use of trade secret COTS voting system software!

Election integrity groups who signed formal letters requesting amendments to enable the use of trade secret COTS software on voting systems, include:

Alliance for Democracy
Audit AZ
Black Box Voting
Broward Election Reform Coalition
Coalition for Voting Integrity (PA)
Democracy for New Hampshire
Las Vegas (NM) Peace & Justice Center
Main Street Moms (theMMOB.org)
Missourians for Honest Elections
New Yorkers for Verified Voting (NYVV)
North Jersey Impeach Group
Progressive Democrats of America (PDA)
Reach Out America, Nassau Co. NY
Velvet Revolution
Voter Action
Voters Unite
Voting Integrity Alliance of Tampa Bay (VIA Tampa Bay)

In their own words:

"There must be no undisclosed voting system software. However, HR 811's proposed HAVA Section 301(a)(9), as currently written, fails to exempt software that is truly Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) from public disclosure. The bill must be amended to require true COTS software, such as the Windows operating system and standard printer
drivers, to be escrowed and available to officials under confidentiality, but not publicly disclosed."

And

"The prohibition of undisclosed software does not provide any exemption for COTS software (commercial off the shelf). No existing voting equipment meets this requirement because they all use COTS, and many use Microsoft software. Microsoft will never share its code, and this requirement would make every piece of voting equipment in use today illegal, requiring jurisdictions to replace equipment at a high cost, unfunded by HR 811."

Note: Neither of these statements recommend prohibiting the use of federal dollars on trade secret COTS voting systems; or recommend increasing the time frames to develop fully disclosed voting systems. Black Box Voting, Voters Unite, Democracy for New Hampshire, Verified Voting of New York, Voter Action, Alliance for Democracy and others recommend exempting COTS software from full disclosure or requiring legally unenforceable requirements for partial COTS software disclosure.

Let me be clear: The position of Black Box Voting, Voters Unite, Democracy for New Hampshire and these other election integrity groups is that your federal tax dollars should be used to pay for trade secret software on voting systems; and they want that codified in federal law!

What benefits do these election reform groups imagine would be obtained from trade secret voting system software? Not one of the groups who publicly endorse trade secret voting system software has made public justification of their position since they formally adopted it on February 13, 2007.

Note: Common Cause and PFAW in 2002 likewise ignored the advice of technologists and helped vendors to push for implementation of in-auditable electronic-ballot voting machines. The new election integrity groups are similarly thumbing their noses at a large group of computer scientists and technologists to push for secret, costly, less secure, less reliable, and less verifiable COTS voting system software.

Democracy for New Hampshire objects not only to current proposals requiring full software disclosure, but also objects to current proposals which mandate manual counts of paper ballots in the 2008 election! In her own words, without justification, peer review or collaboration with other election integrity activists, Nancy Tobi of Democracy for New Hampshire states:

"10. Section 328. Effective Date for Audits. Impossible effective date [2008] for implementation among states for whom no such audit function currently exists."

Why are election integrity groups insisting that taxpayers purchase voting systems with trade secret software and adopting positions against independent verification of the 2008 election?

Your guess could be as good as mine. I have worked with dozens of computer scientists and technologists to understand and explain the issue of voting system software disclosure to layman since 2003. Here is a recent article on the topic of voting system software disclosure written by with the help of numerous technologists:

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/dopp/VotingSystemSoftwareDisclosure.pdf

What is the solution? Paperless DRE machines should be immediately replaced with optical scan paper ballot systems before the 2008 election. The 2008 election should be manually audited in sufficient amounts to ensure accurate election outcomes. After that, no further federal funds should be spent on trade secret voting systems; and all voting systems, including DREs, optical scanners, and central election management systems should be replaced with fully independently auditable, fully publicly disclosed voting systems.

References:

Brad Friedman's Quote

Resources which describe the complexities of verifying the integrity of software running on voting systems include these:

"Avoid Another HAVA Train Wreck: Software Disclosure Requirements are a Good Long Term Goal but Need to Be Redrafted in Current Federal Election Integrity Legislation." By Kathy Dopp and dozens of technologists and computer scientists

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/dopp/VotingSystemSoftwareDisclosure.pdf

David Wagner, computer scientist in his testimony before the House Admin committee

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/HearingTestimony/wagner.pdf

Holt's HR 811, A Deceptive Boondoggle -- 10 Blunders to Fix by Bruce O'Dell

http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_bruce_o__070221_holt_s_hr_811_a_dece.htm

Their formal letters objecting to fully publicly disclosed software as proposed by Representatives Holt and Tubb-Jones, and Senators Clinton and Nelson:

"Thirteen Issues with the Holt Bill (HR 811)" by Nancy Tobi of Democracy for New Hampshire also takes current election reform bills to task for requiring independent manual counts of ballots in the upcoming 2008, claiming that any requirement for manual audits should be postponed until 2010.

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/13_problems_Holt811_Tobi

"Essential Revisions to HR 811" by John Gideon of Voters Unite is signed by Black Box Voting, by Verified Voting of New York, by Voter Action and many other major election integrity groups.

http://www.votersunite.org/info/HR811EssentialRevisions.htm

Because I have noticed that both Voters Unite and Democracy for New Hampshire have made edits to their written statements without acknowledgement in the past, I have made copies of the April 7, 2007 versions of their public position statements here:

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/PositionStatements/13_problems_Holt811_Tobi.htm

and

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/PositionStatements/HR811EssentialRevisions.htm

Democracy Campaign Update

2007-03-29T19:40:00.000-07:00

This is a big week for election reform – and PFAW’s work in the Democracy Campaign – on several fronts.

The Committee on House Administration is voting to mark up Rep. Rush Holt’s Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act (H.R. 811), which would solve many of the security and accountability problems with ALL voting machines before the 2008 elections. And the House Judiciary Committee is expected to mark up H.R. 1281, the House version of Sen. Obama’s Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act. The movement of this bill is a giant step toward stopping individuals and groups that use intimidation and misinformation to disenfranchise voters (who are often targeted by race or economic status).

And in the states…

In Colorado, a bill has been introduced that would establish permanent “no excuse” absentee voting – a policy which drastically improves access to the ballot box, increasing civic participation and strengthening democracy.

In California, a “deceptive practices” bill similar to the federal legislation is set to have hearings starting in April.

In Maryland, both the House and Senate have passed legislation to restore voting rights more swiftly to certain people with felony convictions who previously had to wait three years for the right to vote, even after fully completing their sentences. Also in Maryland, the House just passed legislation, similar to the Holt bill, requiring paper trails for electronic voting machines.

Read about our Election Reform work in the states:
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=23501

E-Petitions Offer 'Opportunity For Informed Debate'

2007-03-21T09:35:00.000-07:00

Local authorities should not be dissuaded from launching e-petitioning services by the recent controversy surrounding the e-petitioning service provided on the Prime Minister's website, according to Bristol City Council.

The service on the Number 10 website, which launched in November 2006, has come under heavy attack from the media and some MPs on two widely different grounds: that it is a public relations exercise, offering the public no genuine involvement in policy issues, or that it paves the way for "mob rule".

Neither of these need be the outcome for e-petition systems run by local authorities, according to Carol Hayward, Corporate Consultation Manager at Bristol City Council. In the two and a half years that the Bristol system has been running, 60 e-petitions have been submitted, collecting a total of 20,000 signatures. The result has been improved policies, more transparent decision-making, and closer links between councillors and the community, she told E-Government Bulletin.

"It's been really useful for raising issues that councillors hadn't thought of, and for finding out public opinion," said Hayward. Unlike the Number 10 service, the Bristol e-petitioning system hosts online discussions, and is used by politicians as well as members of the public. Guidance on how to set up and run a similar service is part of a new e-democracy guide available from the council, http://fastlink.headstar.com/bristol4.

Dr. Rec on Voter Fraud vs. Election Fraud

2007-03-17T18:55:00.000-07:00

Citizens for Legitimate Government... Note the White House and Justice emphasis on voter fraud, as opposed to election fraud. The distinction is not a minor one. Voter fraud places the blame for election scandals on so-called felonious and 'dead' voters whose votes are reputedly cast for Democrats. These felons and dead-men-voting are the old boogie men of Republican rhetoric regarding elections.

Election fraud, on the other hand, might include organizational, party-level, state-collusive manipulation and/or purging of voter rolls, the failure to count or the miscounting of ballots, the destruction of ballots, the failure to recount ballots when legally required to do so by state laws, the illegal use of election facilities for party purposes, the state-sanctioned targeting of precincts for faulty or inadequate amounts of equipment, and of course, the manipulation of electronic voting machine tabulations.

In short, election fraud includes the very serious and major problems that did account for the election thefts of 2000 as well as 2004. While voter fraud is a notorious boogie man-the alleged dead-man-voting that no one can locate on the ground.

New voting machines could be trashed

2007-03-06T21:30:00.000-08:00

New voting machines could be trashed New voting machines could be trashed
Altered U.S. law would require radical changes

Heads up for US Congressman Holt and Senator Nelson, and others

2007-03-06T03:52:00.000-08:00

Please contact your US Senators and US Representative (especially Representative Rush Holt's office and Senator Bill Nelson's office) and ask them to read this paper which explains the problems of trying to verify the software integrity of voting machines:

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/dopp/VotingSystemSoftwareDisclosure.pdf

Your Senators and Representative's contact information is available here:

http://senate.gov/
and
http://house.gov/

I have provided a sample email or letter to US Congressional staff below that you can modify and send. Please forward this email to your email lists.

Dear Congressional Staffer Who Works on Election Integrity:

Please be so kind as to read this paper which was written with the help of dozens of skilled technologists, because it explains for the lay person, the complexities of voting system software disclosure and shows why the current software disclosure proposals by Representative Holt and Senator Nelson (HR811 and S559) would not work and must be rewritten.

"Avoid Another HAVA Train Wreck: Software Disclosure Requirements are a Good Long Term Goal But Need to Be Redrafted in Current Federal Election Integrity Legislation"

http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/dopp/VotingSystemSoftwareDisclosure.pdf

Current voting system software disclosure provisions in federally proposed legislation need to be rewritten, perhaps in separate legislation, in consultation with experts with diverse technical backgrounds.

It might be wiser to pass simpler legislation requiring sufficient manual audits and public access to election records that are necessary to verify election outcomes that could be implemented by 2008, and put any requirements for long-term improvement of voting equipment that require time for development cycles into a separate bill.

It is very important for Congressional staffers who are tasked with considering election integrity legislation in each Congressional office to know that we need a clean election bill that would ensure accurate election outcomes by 2008, plus realistic measures to achieve better voting systems long-term - not another HAVA mess.

Congressional staffers are also urged to read this evaluation of the Holt/Nelson election audits, which shows how the Holt/Nelson election audit could be revised to assure that election audits protect all US House districts, even in close races.

"Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity"
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/TierElectionAuditEval.pdf

and a list of some of the loopholes and flaws of HR811/S559 that would need to be fixed:

http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/ChangesNeeded2HR811.pdf

2 county officials back paper trail for vote machines

2007-03-05T20:06:00.000-08:00

2 county officials back paper trail for vote machines

Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity

2007-03-03T11:23:00.000-08:00

A report in PDF mathematically analyzes the election audits proposed by the US Congress and finds that they would not protect all US House races; and proposes alternatives:

From: National Election Data Archive, Park City, UT
Contact: Kathy Dopp, President, NEDA kathy@uscountvotes.org 435-658-4657

To require voter-verified permanent paper ballots and increase voter confidence and accessibility, U.S. Representative Rush Holt of New Jersey and U.S. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida have sponsored virtually identical bills (HR811 and S559) that are intended to correct some of the significant, if unintended consequences of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002.

Election officials in most states have not subjected election results to independent outside audits – manual counts of randomly-selected voter-verified paper ballots.

Tiered election audits are audits which manually count more precincts in close races. When a race is close, a small number of miscounted votes can alter the outcome and a robust audit is needed to find miscounts which could be hidden in a few precincts. While there are several identified concerns with the Holt and Nelson bills, Kathy Dopp, President of National Election Data Archive, and NEDA have released a report "Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity" evaluating the sufficiency of the Holt and Nelson audit provisions, as shown in the table.

HR811 and S559 election audit provisions ignore the variety in the amount of precincts in U.S. House districts. For example, a 10% audit in an 800-precinct House district requires an audit of 80 precincts, whereas a 10% audit in a 150-precinct House district triggers an audit of only 15 precincts, resulting in statistically insufficient power to detect miscounts in a close race where fewer than 1 in 15 miscounted precincts could alter the outcome.

A group of university professors wrote a letter in support of Holt's audit proposal, "Thoughts on Mandatory Audits". Dopp's says that her calculations agree with the professors' for the few cases that the professors evaluated but that their analysis was restricted only to U.S. House races with 400 total precinct vote counts for only a few selected margins; and did not consider House races with closer margins or smaller number of precincts.

"Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity" shows how to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed election audits by plotting colorful charts of the probabilities for protecting race with particular margins between the leading candidates against the total number of precincts for Congressional districts.

According to Dopp, the Holt and Nelson audit provisions would not protect many U.S. House races where "protected" means that there is at least a 50% chance of discovering miscount under the assumption that sufficient miscount exists to alter an outcome.

"Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity" suggests alternatives designed to protect all U.S. House races, including an alternative to fix the Holt and Nelson audit by requiring minimum numbers of precincts to be audited. To protect all U.S. House races, a larger audit rate is necessary for districts with a fewer precincts.

As with all legislation, cost is a consideration. Therefore an accurate cost estimate for conducting nation-wide manual audits of federal elections is needed. Dopp says that Congressional staffers asked her to calculate cost estimates for nationwide audits of federal elections, but that election data, including the margins and number of total precincts for all recent U.S. House and Senate races, is necessary for each state and for recent elections in order to perform the calculations.

Unfortunately states are not required to collect or make publicly available precinct-level election results (or other detailed vote counts, data, or election records that are necessary for public oversight over election integrity) so that this data required for calculating an accurate cost estimate for election auditing for Congress is very difficult to obtain and must be obtained from an organization like Election Data Services which has been collecting it laboriously from numerous jurisdictions for years, and can extract it from their databases.

Kathy Dopp, President of National Election Data Archive, recently met with Congressional staff in Washington DC to recommend changes to the proposed federal election integrity bills - statistically valid election audits and public access to election records and data necessary for citizen oversight.

Tax-deductible donations to defray the $1,500 cost to obtain the data for a cost estimate for conducting audits of all federal elections from Election Data Services are accepted at ElectionArchive.org. Please help us give Congress a good cost estimate for conducting nationwide audits of federal elections.

The report "Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity" can be found at:
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/TierElectionAuditEval.pdf

This release in pdf format with chart and table can be found at:
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/press/Release-ElectionAuditEval-200703.pdf

People are urged to contact their U.S. Senators and Representative, send them the report, and ask them to support sufficient nationwide audits of federal elections to protect all U.S. House and Senate races. See http://senate.gov and http://house.gov

Voting - The Electronic Process More ...Than You Want to Know

2007-02-23T08:47:00.000-08:00

WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR ELECTRONIC VOTING TECHNOLOGIES

This guy and four others shared ideas and problems in voting.

The day before 9/11 he was scheduled by a number of newspapers to share his information but the newspapers backed off. He also did a synopsis on the recent voting process.

A book about the process is free and online and in pdf.

Michael Shamos, RESEARCH AGENDA

A fundamental problem with electronic voting is that the public, for the first time in 25 years, has been persuaded by computer scientists that DRE machines cannot be relied upon. A critical research agenda, therefore, is to develop sound means by which the machines may be made trustworthy that are readily understandable by the public.

Technologies to be investigated include:

Auditing hardware and software to make an independent record of votes cast.

Self-diagnosing systems built from observer chips to monitor system operation.

Methods for detecting systems changes or demonstrating that no have been made.

Voter-verifiable audit trails not dependent on paper records.

Separation of candidate names, parties and office titles from the vote-casting and recording mechanism so no useful tampering is possible.

Secure software distribution mechanisms so that uncertified software cannot be installed in a voting machine.

The role of open source software methodology in reducing errors and increasing public trust.

Cryptographic methods allowing universal post-election verifiability.

Thoughtful investigation of Internet voting proposals, including Project SERVE, to pave the way for what is an inevitable method of voting.

A reliable system of reporting and investigating irregularities in DRE voting, including thorough forensic examination.

The standards by which DRE machines are evaluated are inadequate and out-of-date. What is needed is not a static set of standards or tests, but a process by which such standards can be kept current.

The DRE debate has raised some fundamental computer science questions, about which experts disagree, especially the question whether it is possible to tamper with software in a way that is fundamentally undetectable. Essentially no research has been done on this question or on methods for detecting changes to software.

A much more pressing problem than DRE security is the inability of millions of voters to vote on election day because they are outside their home jurisdiction and have not been able to comply with absentee procedures. The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) estimates the number of voters so disenfranchised at over 5 million for each Presidential election. Far more effort needs to be devoted to developing a sound remote voting mechanism usable by all overseas Americans.

There currently exists no field of "voting science," which would encompass voting technology, policy studies, human-computer interaction, election law, accessibility, computer security, voter identification methods and all other aspects of the complex process of voting.

WOULD you believe Florida is moving back to paper ballots?

Kathy wrote asking all to sign a letter to Congress

2007-02-04T13:33:00.000-08:00

Please sign this letter asking Congress to require routine actions to verify election outcome integrity, and pointing out that 2% audits
won't do that, and that citizen oversight is needed.

Here is the letter which was just completed this a.m.

http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/Letter2Congress.pdf

To sign it, just send your name, full address, any credentials or affiliations to me kathy.dopp@gmail.com

People may add themselves as signees or suggest minor changes to the letter through Wednesday if they want me to hand deliver it in DC during my upcoming trip to the East Coast, although we'll probably continue to add signees after that for people who want to send the letter themselves to their Senators and Representative.

It would be great to get signees from every state, so please forward this to your friends and lists and ask them to sign it also. I'll be updating the letter with new signees, and may sort the signees by state.

Thank you. It is important to get real measures that will assure us of accurate election outcomes because we all know that having paper ballots that are never manually counted leaves our elections wide open to vote fraud or outcome-altering machine errors.

Touch Screen Voting to go in the trash in Florida, thankfully

2007-02-03T06:13:00.000-08:00

Yes.

TALLAHASSEE — Eager to end six troublesome years of touch screen voting in Florida, Gov. Charlie Crist wants every county to switch to paper ballots by 2008.

PittsburghJack's Place: The Voting Dead

2007-01-04T10:29:00.000-08:00

PittsburghJack's Place: The Voting Dead: "The Voting Dead"